TO HIS HIGHNESS

SRI KRISHNARAJA WADIYAR IV

G.C.S.I., G.B.E.

MAHARAJA OF MYSORE

THE GUARDIAN OF RIGHT

THE LEADER OF HIS PEOPLE

THE PROTECTOR OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

राजाने धर्मगोप्तारं धर्मो रक्षति रक्षितः

WORKS BY THE SAME AUTHOR

THE IDEA OF THE HOLY. Fifth Impression. Oxford University Press.

SIN AND ORIGINAL GUILT. English Translation in Preparation. Oxford University Press.

NATURALISM AND RELIGION. Williams and Norgate.

PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION. English Translation in Preparation. Williams and Norgate.

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Ramanuja

INDIA'S RELIGION OF GRACE AND CHRISTIANITY COMPARED AND CONTRASTED

BY


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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

To professional theologians Prof. Otto needs no introduction. But, as it is hoped that this book will be also read by many of the great number of laymen interested in religious questions and especially in foreign missions, to whom he may not be so well known, let me say that he is generally acknowledged as one of the very first theologians of Germany. Trained in the school of Ritschl, he has far transcended that teacher. His *Idea of the Holy* has had a most remarkable and widely extended reception throughout the Christian world. While he belongs unmistakably to the number of modern liberals, he has not gone with those who, in attempting to bring theology into consistency with modern thought, have denied the fundamental facts of Christian experience. He might even be called, in a modified and popular sense, a mystic. His more recent studies and publications in Indian religions and theologies have attracted much attention and this book contains a most remarkable and perhaps startling disclosure of a true "religion of grace" in that ancient land. English and American readers will be reminded by it of the high Calvinism of earlier days in their own countries.

What Prof. Otto thinks of the merits of this Indian religion in comparison with Christianity he reveals at length in the following pages. His hopes for a turning of its adherents to Christianity in the immediate future may not be very strong. But it furnishes more evidence, in addition to that furnished by pious Moslems and Japanese Buddhists, of the working of the Spirit of God among all men, by which an actual preparation has already been made for the coming of the day when all the world will be united in one faith and one communion, which will be the Kingdom of God.

The direct bearing of this story of Indian religion upon the practical labours of the Christian missionary, and also upon our own theological reconstruction in the West, needs no elaborate discussion here. It is at once self-evident.

FRANK H. FOSTER

OBERLIN, OHIO
July 1930

AUTHOR'S PREFACE

My very respectful and hearty thanks are due to his Highness, the Mahārāja of Mysore, and at the same time the impartial protector and patron of all religious communions, mine own as well, which have in his land rights of domicile and enjoy undisturbed freedom; the unwearied promoter of science and culture, of economic and spiritual progress, in his glorious land. By his kindness I was able to pursue my studies in his beautiful capital, Mysore, for a considerable time, undisturbed and under the most favourable conditions, visit the temples, libraries, and schools, form the acquaintance of the scholars and spiritual leaders of different religious communions, and have been able till this day to continue our mutual exchanges and our intercourse. Among these I give special thanks to the former Curator of the University of Mysore, Subrahmanya Iyer, who taught me, better than books could do, the spirit of the teaching of his Master, Sankara; to the unwearicdly helpful Director of the Archæological Museum in Mysore, Dr Śāma Śāstrin; to the reverend Parakālasvāmin, the present head of the church of Rāmānuja; and to the learned Alcondavilli Govinda-ācārya, who for many years has published, in ever multiplied

labours, the texts and doctrines of his school. Especial thanks are due to the two Gurus, the Parakāla-svāmin of Mysore and the Jagad-guru of Sringeri, for the gift of silver copies of the statues of the divinities in their sanctuaries, and their own pictures, for our Collection for the Science of Religion in Marburg, which will remain as one of its finest ornaments.

With heartfelt thanks and personal reverence do my thoughts recur to the venerable man whose blessing accompanied me upon my journey to India, and whose kind recommendation helped me in my labours, the Archbishop of Canterbury and Primate of all England, Dr Davidson, who has since entered into rest. *Requiescat in pace et lux aeterna luceat ei!*

RUDOLF OTTO

MARBURG

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INDIA'S RELIGION OF GRACE AND CHRISTIANITY

II

A COMPETITOR OF CHRISTIANITY?

HAS our Christian faith competitors? Only too many, if we put the question generally, and understand by "competitor" whatever may seek place in our hearts or control over our lives that is not our faith but in rivalry with it. "The World" and worldly interests are such—and not only the "World" in the non-moral or immoral sense of the "flesh," of our animal nature and the unspiritual things within us, but also the world as the domain of worthy and great spiritual interests, as the manifold domain of values æsthetic, cultural, nay, even specifically ethical. This too may become a competitor and contend "for our souls," restrict the place of faith, take breath and power from it, and force itself upon us with the claim to have not merely place in our hearts but the chief place, and the supremacy. The question is not now put, however, in this most general sense, but in a narrow and specific sense.

We call Christianity "religion." We even

call it "a" religion. And we thereby admit that it may be compared with other great spiritual phenomena which we also acknowledge as "religions," however different and distinct they may be. It is in reference to these that we now put the question whether there are among the "religions" of the earth competitors of Christianity, and such competitors as not only *make* the claim to be equal or even superior to it, but because of their nature *have* a well-founded claim to be regarded as such.

If they are to be regarded as genuine competitors, they must be examined not merely for what they have to offer as values in more superficial aspects—in subtile speculation, in profound theories of the structure of the universe, and the like—but in the specifically religious sphere. And here again they must be considered with regard to that which Christianity has to offer as its deepest and most characteristic element, as its peculiar and central idea—or better, as its peculiar gift, the last and highest good which it has to give humanity. And this is that wondrous good which only the religious man knows, understands, and seeks, viz., *redemption* and *salvation, sōtēria, salus.*

The astonishing thing for a Christian is that the questions regarding *these* highest and last things in religion have not been put and answered only in Palestine; but, as it would appear, exactly the same conceptions play the same part in the religion and theological speculations of India!

Moksha, *mukti*, *rakshanā*, *śreyas*, *niḥśreyasa*, *mukta*—these highest and most solemn names and ideas of Indian soteriology can scarcely be reproduced but by the terms redemption, rescue, welfare and salvation, and redeemed. And Indian thinkers have not engaged in speculation for the sake of mere metaphysics or to gain a theoretical view of the universe, but the purpose has been to give a doctrine of salvation, that is to set forth the "way" to a good above the world and infinite, which is at the same time fundamentally different from all mere happiness and cannot be estimated in worldly values, not even in "moral" values, but has a purely religious value. Involvement in the boundless misery of "being lost," longing for "redemption" from the chains of such misery—a misery arising directly from the mere fact that man and the world are what they are—the way through redemption to an eternal, imperishable good which cannot be compared with anything of earth or either found or appropriated by one's own reason or power, but is an "altogether different" good—these are in India as well as with us the impelling interests, awakened by the text and the meaning of the *Śruti*, the Holy Scriptures of the old Upanishads. And, consequently, the Indian systems of doctrine, too, are not properly "philosophy," but doctrine founded upon "faith,"[1] not interesting metaphysics, but theology.

If one desires to know what religion is, it is not enough to turn to speculation, however

[1] *Glaubenslehre.*

sagacious or profound, or to definitions of the "Absolute" in this or that sense, but he must turn to the longing, peculiar to religion, which the "natural" man necessarily thinks quite fantastic, the longing after this utterly "irrational" and infinite good which is "salvation." The historian of religion must recognize this aspect of the subject if he is not to fail utterly in grasping his theme. He may define it as a "fancied" good, and may explain it as a "product of the development" of the "folk-psychology," or seek other explanations for this fact. But he will be compelled to acknowledge the stubborn fact that this seeking for "salvation" and the belief in its attainment constitute, in the features thus indicated, the inner being of the great religions of the East as well as the West.[1]

The most remarkable parallels in the questions put, the answers given, and the methods employed, are to be found between the great speculative productions of the theologians and scholastics of the East and of the West. But this fact alone would not of itself be enough to render it possible to compare them. They are comparable first of all because they are at bottom doctrines of "salvation," put their questions as to the Absolute, the world, the soul, and God, only in order to develop the theme of "salvation," and for this reason employ methods and means

[1] And if he does not wish to pass unscientifically beyond the limits of mere history, he must add that history does not afford the means of saying anything, either positive or negative, about the possibility or the reality of "salvation."

so strikingly similar, and formulate propositions so astonishingly alike.

It appears, therefore, that *there is* a competition and that at the very centre. And the consideration of such competition is certainly no longer for us in the West a mere matter for a doctor's thesis! Neither is it matter of interest only for him who proposes to go to the East to contend with "heathenism" there. It has long since become a burning question of the day for Christianity at home. The great Oriental religions, for very different reasons, are already knocking at our own doors. For a long time, have their ideas and doctrines and methods—felt to be partly strange and partly sublime—been crowding upon us. They have long been gaining a hearing. And already the religious circles of the East have been equipping themselves for missionary efforts in other lands, there to seek and find, to "rescue" and to lead those who need, as they think, the "light from the East" for their "salvation." They begin in fact to be competitors with us in a very tangible sense of the word. And we shall do well to make ourselves acquainted with such competitors, and to examine whether they can really compete, can compete not in conformity to the "spirit of the age," or in "modernness," or in metaphysical depth, high speculation, etc., but in showing us the "way." to—*salvation*. That is, however, to ask whether they are not only actual competitors but rightful competitors of Christianity. It is a question which cannot be answered with a general and

a priori argument regarding the "absoluteness of Christianity"; the situation of affairs, and especially the situation on the mission field itself, rather demands that we show concretely and with full knowledge of our antagonist, that Christ is another and brings us something different from Buddha or Krishna or any other "Master" of the East whatever.

In this relation, however, the most important or interesting of the religious bodies of the East are not those which have the greatest number of adherents or attract the interest of speculative minds by the keenness and depth of their speculations, or excite our curiosity and secure our æsthetic complacency by the wealth of their theological or mythological discussions, by the greatness and beauty of their symbolism, but those which seem to have come near to Christianity in their inmost idea. That is, those who seem to compete with it in the specific and peculiar significance[1] of their "idea of salvation." Are there such, and which are they?

The answer which one may expect from our own theologians, with a certain degree of sharpness, is something like this: "The religion of India is, in its last and highest form, the religion of acosmistic mysticism.[2] Its 'salvation,' the 'Brahma-nirvāna,' may be as supermundane as you like, and may be attractively praised as the 'summum bonum,' but it is so antithetic to Christianity and so absolutely different from it

[1] *Sondergehalt.*
[2] A mysticism denying the reality of world, things, personality.

that, in spite of the formal likeness in its striving after a good above the world, there is here no true parallel and therefore no true competition in the same sphere and for the same end."

I will not attempt at this time to oppose certain easy-going and rather superficial interpretations of a particular form of the Vedānta. I have already occupied myself with it in my book, *West-Östliche Mystik*. But I will here remark that in India itself there has been waged the hottest battle *against* this "monistic" mysticism of an impersonal Absolute, and that there has arisen there, moved by original impulses and drawn from original sources, that which I call its "religion of grace." And it is this which I have in mind as the keenest "competitor" of our form of faith.

What is the good conferred in salvation by Christianity? Communion with the living, personal God. What is the means of salvation? Grace, *gratia* and *gratia sola*, which lays hold of the lost, rescuing and redeeming him. Now these are the very slogans and distinctive terms of those forms of the bhakti-religion of which we are to speak. It is on their account that there seems to have arisen in India a competitor of almost astonishing similarity—a competitor which seems to dispute the sole possession by Christianity of that which is its very heart—first, the salvation which comes not from profound speculation and for the wise, but is offered to all, and to the "poor in spirit" in particular; secondly, the salvation which comes not by mystic experiences,

by the loss of personality in the impersonal primal cause of all being, but by bhakti, that is by surrender in simple, trusting appropriation of the "grace" of the "Lord," and in love to him; and thirdly, the salvation which comes not through the toil of good "works," but is the free gift of grace, and by the saving might of "the Lord.") Beginning in the profound verses of the pre-Christian *Bhagavad-gītā*, the book most loved and honoured by millions of Hindus, passing through times of obscuration and reformation, as with us, this doctrine of grace rises till it gains at last positions which dumbfound us Protestants by their analogy to our fundamental ideas—*gratia sola, per fidem solam, sine omnibus propriis viribus, meritis, aut operibus*—and which have led to like harshness and "offence" in India as with us.

Bhakti-religion and the strange perplexities of its "doctrine of grace" have in the East not only seized upon Hinduism, but have also penetrated and shaped certain peculiar forms of doctrine and communions in Buddhism. The first news of this reached the Occident when the great Catholic missionary Xavier and his followers arrived in Japan and wrote home that they had met with the "Lutheran Heresy" among the Japanese Buddhists. They found the most widespread form of popular Buddhism to be the doctrine of the Buddha *Amitābha-Amitāyus*, the eternally transcendent Buddha of infinite splendour and endless life, and of his saving "vow." Long anticipated in India and China, it had been widely

spread by the two teachers Honen-shonin and Shinran-shonin, and is to-day the strongest school of Japanese Buddhism. One of its adherents, a Japanese priest who attended my lectures on Christian doctrine, brought me one day an old Chinese book with beautiful pictures. They showed this world of ours as the place of misery and loss, and gave threatening representations of the torments of the lost in the halls of the Abyss. One of the pictures exhibited a strange scene which I did not understand: a mighty stream frozen thick and fast in the hard cold of winter. On the ice were men who were dragging large basins of glowing coals. They cast these upon the ice to thaw it. However many they scattered upon it, the ice always formed again, and they could not reach the water flowing beneath it. The Buddhist priest explained the picture thus. "'These are the people who exert themselves to get access to the water of salvation by their own works, 'by their own strength.' But one's own strength and work effect nothing. Only the rescuing grace of the Buddha of an endless life melts the ice. And only he who calls upon his name with faith and trust reaches the water."

This book was the same as the young Shinran-shonin had read, and which gave him the first impulse to seek the way of salvation not by "his own strength" but by the "strength of another," viz., Buddha. And as I was taking a walk in Japan with a young man of the same sect, and asked him in my surprise how it happened that he spoke so good German and what had

occasioned his selecting German as his specialty, he told me: "Our teacher told me that there was once a Shinran in Germany too, who proclaimed salvation by grace alone, without one's own works, by the name of Martin Luther. So I determined to learn German in order to get acquainted with the Shinran of the West in his own language."

Such a doctrine of the bhakti in Japanese Buddhism is not derived, however, as some have thought, from the Christian West. There can be no doubt that it has a connexion with the bhakti movement in India of which the *Bhagavad-gîtâ*, already mentioned, affords the first important proof. And at the same time it is clear that its form in India is much nearer our own ideas of faith than is the form given to it by Buddhism. For, while the doctrine of the Shin-shu evidently approaches a theistic conception and meaning, yet it can never be allowed quite to reach this, and must be diverted from its last consequences by ever-recurring precautions, for otherwise it would burst the framework of Buddhism. This can never become "theistic" in the proper sense, can never acknowledge an *Îswara*, *i.e.* the personal God above the world as the creator of it. Even the good of the salvation which is departure to Amida and to his paradise cannot be acknowledged, when taken seriously, as the proper and ultimate goal of salvation, but must be viewed as only the final point before entrance upon "Nirvâna," which is the extinguishing of all personality and thereby of all personal relations

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of faith and love, which are possible only between "persons."

Quite otherwise is it with the bhakti-religion of certain communions in India. There is here no shadowy form of an Amida, alternating between symbol and reality. But here is the sharply defined and living *Iśvara*, the "Lord," the one and eternal God, who is the God possessing salvation for those who believe in him and who does not lead them to an impersonal *Nirvāṇa*, which should be conceived as lying far above him and above the communion with him, but who, with this communion as the miracle of all miracles, is genuine and remains such for ever. In this Indian bhakti-religion there is presented, without doubt, a real, saving God, believed, received, and—can we doubt it?—experienced. And this is just why this religion appears to me to have been, and to be to-day, the most astonishing "competitor," to be taken most seriously.

The bhakti-movement has, in increasing degree, seized upon almost all the greater systems of thought in India and greatly modified them. Even Sankara, the teacher of the strenuous *advaita* and of the *ekatā-darśanam*, of the mystical intuition of unity with the Brahman, recognizes it as a way of preparation for the gradual[1] redemption. The bhakti-chapters of Śāndilya are a witness to this profound modification. And a follower of Sankara said to me: "You Christians are the same as our bhaktas. Your relation to

[1] *Stufenweise.*

God is that of a child to his father. We also approve that. Still, the true and final completion of the *ekatā-bhāva*, the relation of complete unity and oneness with God, lies far above and beyond it." And in sacred Nāsik an orthodox Brahmin gave me a much read book which contained the same combination in popular form. He himself, although a follower of Sankara, was with his family a zealous visitor of the temple of Rāma, the human manifestation of *Īśvara*, and in his customary devotions a bhakta, *i.e.* a man who has entered upon the way of bhakti. But it is a more important fact that great and wide circles of the pious people of India recognize with glowing enthusiasm the way of the bhakti as the *only* way, and reject that of Sankara as damnable heresy and soul destructive error. Thus a venerable teacher of the school of Rāmānuja said to me: "I would sooner become a Christian than acknowledge the teachings of Sankara; and I have more fellowship with you than with his followers."

The greatest theologian of this purified bhakti-school was Rāmānuja, from whose great work I have in my *Siddhānta of Rāmānuja* (Tübingen, 1923) translated the fundamental chapters of his system, which was intended to replace the impersonal Vedānta by the doctrine of a personal God. He lived about A.D. 1100. He was not the founder of this religion, and would not have welcomed such an ascription. He stands upon a very old tradition; and even the systematic teaching of his school had already received its form before his

day at the hands of the acute Yãmuna-muni, to whom Rãmãnuja sustains much the relation that Thomas does to Albertus Magnus. From Yãmuna and Rãmãnuja on, the division between the *impersonal* and the *personal*, Vedãnta was complete. The two parties became more and more antagonistic; and the school of Rãmãnuja becomes clearly marked off and solidly united by an "apostolical succession" of its leaders, and distinguished as a separate confession, if not as a separate religion. There are parallels to it in other circles in India. But Rãmãnuja's school affords a specially favourable opportunity for the study of the bhakti-religion. It is distinguished from other communions by a conscious exclusiveness, pronounces the other sects "heretics," and declares them to be outside the *Veda*, "disguised Buddhists," and despisers of *Íśvara*. It maintains its exclusiveness by an exclusive association of its leaders, by its own rites, ritual, educational institutions and places of worship, theology and hymnology, and also by strict rules regarding intercourse and cleanness in relation to the heterodox. *It* names itself from its Reformer the church[1] of Rãmãnuja, as we call ourselves Lutherans. And there early arose among them, the problems presented by the doctrine of grace, problems increasingly acute, which produced in India the division between the synergists and the advocates of an exclusive doctrine of grace, as they have in Germany between the "Philippists" and the "Gnesiolutherans."

[1] *Gemeinde.*

We will now attempt to gain a more intimate knowledge of this strange religion by inquiring regarding its struggle for God, its doctrine of salvation and the way of salvation, and then regarding its relation to Christianity.

II

A Struggle for God

Long before the bhakti-religion had assumed a settled form, men had sought in India for God, had questioned, struggled, and known about him, and not merely about, a God of metaphysical speculation, but a real and living God. In my book *Vishṇu-Nārāyaṇa* I have already told the story of these "struggles of faith," how they were long ago fought out and won by the pious King Yudhishthira and his wife Draupadī. In strange likeness to what we find in our Book of Job, the questions and temptations of the believer are repeated there. Yudhishthira, driven from his rightful throne by the scoffer Duryodhana, is compelled to wander in want, pursued by adversity. His noble wife is assailed by doubt and even despair of God. She does not doubt his existence, or his sole divinity, or his might, but does doubt his righteousness and his truth in his dealings with pious men, and, like Job's wife, she comes near cursing him :—

> He unites, dissolves, as blind whims bid,
> And as a child with children's baubles he plays
> with his creatures.

Thou liest in the dust, while Duryodhana lifts
his head.
God I reproach, who calmly looks, if insolence
aspires.

But Yudhishthira remains firm in his faith and rebukes his wife for her blasphemy :—

Cease thy speech ! Touch not the holy faith and
law.
The highest Maker of his creatures, the Lord,
Blaspheme no more. Oh ! find him true,
And bow to him, eternal Refuge, bow thy head.

He knows "the Lord," and knows him not only as the dreadful *Deus absconditus*[1]—omni-

[1] This *Deus absconditus* is known and cited by Draupadi two thousand years before Luther's book, *De servo arbitrio*. She uses the term *mask*, "God makes his creatures his mask," just as Luther says, "*Deus latitans in creaturis* : *creatura* larva *Dei*" :—

Entered into his creatures (the plaything of his absolute power
and sole causality), and hiding himself behind them, he tarries
And none can say, Here, see, is God.

"God" as the Being of Righteousness, Truth, and Pity, cannot be discovered. He has "hidden" himself and has disappeared from every searching eye behind the dark omnipotence of uncontrolled will. These are the things which man finds in his primitive religion of "absolute dependence." The like terms which emerge here, independently of time and place, at a distance of centuries, and at places as remote as Hastinapura from Wittenberg, exhibit the likeness of the original numinous feeling which breaks forth also with primitive might in Luther, in his contest with the rational God of Erasmus. *Cf.* Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*.

A further strange parallel : Luther retains this *Deus absconditus*, but overcomes his terror by "the word of promise," and faith. Yudhishthira does not deny these mysterious depths ; he says to his wife :—

O Queen,
Divinities *are* of secret might,

But he rebukes her human wit which will reckon with God while entering complaint against him. And he refers her to the "word" which was given to the messengers of revelation :—

potence acknowledging no law of "righteousness" or "faith," an inscrutable, almighty fate —but as the God who wills the right, and demands it of obedient men, and who is the refuge of his own by the power of faith in the word of the Veda. His human wisdom is not sufficient to solve the riddles of theodicy. But he knows what duty and the will of God are, and is of the mind and the loyalty to obey him.

The God of whom this splendid tale in the old Indian epic *Mahābhārata* tells, bears the name of Vishnu (the all-permeating), reverenced by the societies[1] of his bhaktas. One other great communion of the Hindus, who are likewise bhaktas, reverences "Siva" (the blissful), and has developed doctrines which are like the doctrines of the Vishnu-bhaktas. But the special problems of the doctrine of grace have been developed more acutely and in greater detail among the Vishnu-bhaktas than among those of Siva. We therefore select the teachings of the former for our immediate study, and shall later compare them with those of the Christians.

Whatever the earliest expressions of the Vishnu-faith *may have been, a god, originally a mere* tribal deity, gathers to himself, as in Israel, in ever-increasing measure, the position and dignity

> . . . to the seers once entrusted (by the self-revealing God), all-knowing and all-seeing.

And he refers her also to "faith" in such a word; not the clever thoughts of men about eternal secrets, but "faith,"

> . . . alone bears those who languish towards heaven,
> As over Ocean's waves the ship bears those who seek the other shore.

[1] *Gemeinden.*

of complete and unique supermundane deity,[1] "Full deity" that is expressed in the Indian sentence: He is the eternal, sole Brahman himself; the one, the highest, the supremely glorious. But he is this in the form of the personal and unique God ego, as the *Îśvara*, *i.e.* as the LORD, not as an impersonal and undefinable Absolute in general. Like ideas of the divine fuse with those peculiar to Vishnu, and thus the names of other high individual gods gather to him, Bhagavat, Hari, Keśava, Nārāyana. Narāyana in particular is emphasized along with Vishnu, and becomes on occasion the chief name. The *Nārāyana-upanishad* is named from him, and it contains the confession:—

> Nārāyana is the eternal, the spotless, inexpressible, changeless, true, pure, only God. There is no second beside him.[2]

There arose, perhaps in the third century before Christ, in the circle of his believers, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, which is ascribed to Krishna, the human embodiment of Vishnu. And in the original form of the *Gītā*, which Garbe has restored, this religion appears in power and impressiveness, beauty and sublimity. It has its periods of further development, of decay, and of renewal and reformation. It becomes entangled with

[1] And this is also in India plainly not the mere result of "folk-psychology" and "development," but without doubt the result of the personal experience of elect and exceptional natures, who here, as well as in Israel, may rightly be termed "prophets."

[2] Cf. *Koran*, Sura cxii.: "He is God alone. . . . There is none like him." F. H. F.

forms of heathenism, and disentangles itself again. The reform begins with popular personalities and singers in Tamil-land and Tamil speech. These are followed by the theologians and doctors of theology. Yāmuna is its most inspired singer and at the same time its learned doctor, in fact a *doctor subtilis* in the East. Rāmānuja (1055-1137)[1] then erects his own theology upon foundations laid in Yāmuna's work, "The threefold Proofs of Soul, God, and Consciousness," and himself becomes and remains the most important figure in this religious circle.

Descendant of a pious family, himself a man of deep piety, and plainly gifted with the faculty of leadership, Rāmānuja was also equipped with the entire philosophical and theological learning of his time. His great theological work, the "high Commentary" on the *Vedānta-sūtras*, which he wrote to supersede Sankara's great work on the same material, won a profound influence in the education of other circles and communions as well as his own. He belongs among the most impressive figures of the entire history of religion on account of the great element of his life. That element was something immense. It was in fact a struggle for God himself.

It was a struggle for God, a real God, not such a God as philosophical speculation gives us, but such as the heart and the soul need and seek, a God to inspire personal trust, love, reverence, and loyal self-surrender.

[1] *Cf.* Ghazali's similar work in Islam. F. H. P.

The school of Sankara was disposed to admit such a God, by way of concession, as it were. That for the naive man, for the pious multitude, there might be such a God, and that one might reverence him, even they were not disposed to deny. But he was just a God for the humbler strata of the "lower knowledge." "We, philosophers, are above it"—so said to me personally a man of this circle, and so they spoke and thought even at the time of Rāmānuja. Vishnu, Hari, Vāsudeva, Siva, Hara, Durgā, Ganeśa, or whatever other names the circles of the bhaktas might select for their *Iswara*, might be good enough for the "lower knowledge." But they all proceeded from *avidyā*, they were begotten of not-knowledge, and had validity only in the world of *māyā* and *avidyā*. For him, however, who had climbed from the "lower" to the "higher knowledge," the "gods," and also the one personal God, had disappeared. God himself was not the "true," the last and highest, the properly real and self-existent, and not the goal of the soul, in its strivings for ultimate salvation. This was attained only in the "higher knowledge," and thereby in that primeval Brahman, abolishing worlds and dissolving the ego and all personality, one only, without a second, without distinguishing signs and definition, and at the same time identical with the soul itself. To him who could not climb so high, one might concede faith in God, but one would then look down upon him from a higher watch-tower.

That was what roused Rāmānuja. While still

a boy, he fled with hot indignation from the instruction of his teacher because this scholar attacked the eternal divine honour of his Lord by a monistic interpretation of the ancient holy texts. And what thus moved the soul of the youth became finally the great task of his life, to which he dedicated himself with full devotion, amid attacks and persecutions rising even to mortal peril. He laboured as a strict scholastic, with the apparatus of learned exegesis, of the theory of knowledge, and of speculative research into the nature of God and the soul, and is reckoned among the "philosophers" of India. But at bottom he is not concerned with "philosophy" but with the defence of a *religious* possession of which he will not consent to be robbed. He is not merely interested in a theory of the world considered in a theistic aspect, but in religion. He wages a fight for God, who for believers in him is "salvation," and the highest and only salvation. And we are interested in him not as a philosopher but as a theologian.

Rāmānuja had to wage his battle, as things were in his day, on various fronts, against materialists and Buddhists, against the highly respected school of the Sānkhyas and against other schools of his land and time. Chiefly, however, against those who stood upon the same traditional ground as himself, on the ground of the *Vedānta*, but explained the old tradition of the Upanishads in conformity with the doctrine of *māyā*, and that means in conformity with the theomonism of the *Kevala-advaita*. This is the

school which, without doubt, stands to-day in the forefront of Indian thinking and feeling, the teaching which we ordinarily mean when we speak of "the mysticism of India," and which we still regard, and very erroneously, as "the" religion of India. Sankara, its greatest representative, had come forward three centuries before Rāmānuja. His school at Rāmānuja's time had crowded other schools back, and was the most influential and most widely acknowledged. It called itself proudly the school of the *Kevala-advaita*, the doctrine of the pure or absolute *advaita*. *Advaita* may be translated well enough by monism; more accurately it means "secondlessness." The *Kevala-advaita* comprises the following main doctrines:—

1. There is only a single genuine reality and existence; and this eternal existence is called the Brahman.

2. It is without a second. That is, beside and external to him there is nothing real, nothing actually and genuinely existing.

3. This means: this entire world of manifoldness and multiplicity which we fancy we behold, exists in truth only as a great, cosmic illusion. It is not actual. It is like a *fata morgana*, like a city of enchantment. It exists only for the thinking of those who live in not-knowledge.

4. To be caught in this not-knowledge of the eternal unity is deception and illusion, and is also the lost condition in which we are all entangled.

5. This lost condition cannot be remedied by

our efforts. All works, whether of the conduct demanded by the ritual or by ethics, are vain to remove the lost condition of those caught in erroneous imagination. They bind him only more firmly to this woeful illusion. And they are the reason why man must wander without cessation from birth to death and again from death to birth, in the endless chain of reincarnations.

6. Only one thing can bring him redemption: the knowledge (*a*) on the one hand, that the world of multiplicity is nothing but illusion, and that only the eternal Being himself, *i.e.* Brahman, is the Real, Eternal, Enduring; and (*b*) on the other hand, the knowledge, *Tat tvam asi*: That (viz., this eternal Brahman), That thou thyself art. Self is called *ātman*. *Ātman* is the living, spiritual element lying at the base of all play of the soul within us. And this *ātman*, when truly understood, is nothing but the one eternal Brahman himself.

7. Wherever this knowledge arises, there the veil of not-knowledge is rent. And thereby is dissipated the illusion of multiplicity, the illusion of the manifold world. Dissipated is the ego, the illusion of the *ahankāra*; and therewith the illusion of the wandering in the chain of reincarnations. Suffering and torment are at an end, for now there is nothing but the eternal one, Brahman, which is essentially free in himself from pain and torment. He is in himself perfect joy,[1] or blessedness.

[1] *Wonne.*

8. This Brahman, which is myself, which I am at bottom, is also in himself without all twofoldness, *i.e.* without all difference. He is definable only by means of Being. In considering him, all predicates disappear, and especially all distinctions, of subject, object, and act of cognition. He is lifted high above all concepts of person and of personal distinctions.

9. And as he is himself beyond the triplicity of knower, known, and knowing, and thereby free from all relations *in* himself, so there is no sort of personal relation *to* him, such as love or reverence, *i.e.* bhakti. There is but one relation to him, viz., the relation of complete identity. But that is no *relation* at all; for where there is only one, there is no longer any relation possible.

Such doctrines are professedly derived from the *Veda*, viz., from its concluding portion, the Vedānta. But they are then supported by logical insight. When we carefully examine, we see:

1. Even our supposed sense perception is by no means able to conceive a real difference. Indeed, it is impossible to give a really clear definition of "distinction."

2. One may prove from Holy Scripture as well as by logical argument that Being and the knowledge of Being are not two different things but identical.

3. In the same way we may logically perceive that a distinction of the act of knowing and the subject of the knowing, which we are accustomed naïvely to assume, does not exist at all.

And consequently this doctrine may be comprised in the following formula :—

The truly Existing that we call Brahman is real, free from every distinction of multiplicity, not differentiated, pure spirit, homogeneous, absolute, eternal consciousness. By illusory imagination, this unity is divided into the manifold distinctions of knower, known, and knowledge, and into an illusory multiplicity of supposed single subjects. The root of this illusion is the mysterious power of not-knowledge (=*avidyâ*). This is at the same time the ground of the pain that is in the world. And it is to be put away only by the higher knowledge, without works, viz., through the knowledge of the unity of the self with the Brahman of eternally redeemed being—one only, without a second.

Rāmānuja, after he has himself set forth this doctrine of his opponent, and after he has played an astute advocate of this doctrine, begins in the *siddhānta* his own development, which, one feels, burns with his soul's rebellion, and in which he does not spare expressions of his inveterate hatred of that which seems to him subversion of the Highest, and blasphemous heresy. He says :—

"This entire teaching of the so-called *Kevala-advaita* monism, presented by our opponent, is nothing but a web of false reasoning, scoffing at every logical distinction. To such fictions can come only a man who has not been elected by that highest Being whom the Holy Scriptures

teach in truth. His understanding must have been disturbed by illusory imaginations, arising from the sins he has committed from his previous births. Hence he no longer knows what words and sentences properly are and affirm, and wanders constantly from the way of right thinking as it arises from sense-perception, reason, and Holy Writ. He who knows the right relation of things, as they appear in passages of the Scriptures logically taken, are given in perception, and arise from all other sources of knowledge, must reject such foolish doctrines."

And now he wages his battle, which is, in its first aspect, a battle of "realism" against "idealism" and "illusionism."

1. The world and manifoldness and multiplicity are real.

2. The testimony of the senses is reliable and proves the reality and multiplicity of things and of ourselves.

3. All consciousness presupposes a subject and an object which is different from consciousness as an act.

4. The ego, as a real ego, and as an individual ego, is not illusory. The phenomena of sleep, also, are no interruption of the existence of the ego, since the ego can remember his sleep and his dreams, and recognizes his identity with himself before sleep in the form of memory.

5. And, most of all, it is impious to think that the consciousness of ego and self should be extinguished in the state of the highest redemp-

tion, as our opponents teach in respect to their *Brahma-nirvāna*.

"For," says Rāmānuja, "if a man who longed for salvation were made to understand: 'As a redeemed soul, I myself shall no more exist as this identical self,' he would decline such a redemption, and be off and away! And the whole doctrine of salvation—which our opponents seek as much as we—would become meaningless."

And now he presents his own quite contrary doctrine.

1. Brahman as Brahman is certainly the highest, the true, and the only one. But that does not mean that there is no world along with him, but that there is no second being with him as his equal, or as the co-founder of the world.

2. This Brahman is, however, the eternal, personal *Īsvara*, *i.e.* the Lord, or God, with divine self-consciousness, with knowledge of himself, with the conscious will to create the world and bestow salvation upon his creatures. With conscious purpose and wise counsel he creates the world. And this creation is no illusion and deception, but genuine and real, and so are we within it.

3. He is, in fact, entirely constituted of "knowledge"; but that means that he is entirely and throughout spirit.

4. And he is not without attributes, but is the summation of all noble attributes. He is the subject of all ideal predicates. He is eternal and infinite, before and above all worlds.

5. He is *advitīya*: *i.e.* he is without any rival,

stands high above all that is otherwise called, in the world and the *Veda*, *deva* or god. And the gods enumerated in the *Veda* are only his servants, created by him and put in their places that they may by his commission complete the formation and order of the world (as we Christians speak of the angels of the heavenly spheres, the higher and lower choirs of archangels and of lower angels).

6. But the Holy Scriptures declare: "*Ekam eva, advitīyam, i.e.* all that is, is one only. The world, therefore, is not distinct from the divine." Rāmānûja also affirms this. He too wishes to hold fast to the ancient doctrine of the *advaita*. But he puts it thus: The world and God are one as the soul and body are one, that is, they are a whole, but, at the same time, markedly and unchangeably different. Before the creation of the world, God comprised it in himself in a "refined form," that is, undeveloped into the existing and diversified manifoldness, in potential form. He unfolds this potential element by creation into "name and form," separates it into this temporalness and spatiality, forms from it the world of sense. And at the same time he dissolves it again and takes it back to its "fine" form, thereafter again to form and renew it in ever repeated creation.

7. That the world is called the "body" of the Lord means that he does not form it from something alien, which might exist in rivalry with himself, like an alien matter (or as a "nothing," an individual and competitive principle beside

the deity), but produces it out of himself,[1] And, at the same time, the relation of soul to body is to designate exactly what Schleiermacher would call "the absolute dependence of the world upon God." "For, so says Rāmānuja, this is the significant thing in the relation of the body to the soul, that the body is absolutely dependent upon the soul." Hence Rāmānuja's teaching also tends by no means to a deification of the world, but is the effort to maintain the complete dependence of the world upon God by means of the old ideas, and to exclude every rival of God in respect to the creation of the world.

8. And further, the Scripture affirms the "great word," *Tat tvam asi*, Thou art That. And it affirms in countless passages, *Brahman* (and this must now mean God) is the *ātman*, is thine own self. These passages of the Holy Scriptures also Rāmānuja must acknowledge, since he is a believer in the Scriptures. But, he says, God is myself just as my soul is the self of my body. As the soul is the supporting, maintaining, defining subject, and the body, as Rāmānuja says, an accessory or a predicate to the soul, so is God the supporting, controlling, all-permeating subject

[1] Paul also says ἐξ αὐτοῦ, all things are *out of* him. The bhakti-masters say—like Paul—that God is not merely the *causa instrumentalis* (δι' αὐτοῦ) but also the *causa materialis* (ἐξ αὐτοῦ) of the world. Their purpose is to do away with all self-existence of the creature, as Paul in Romans xi. 36, which passage has the same purpose.—With the strange *positive* meaning which zero has in the Indian theory of numbers, as B. Heyman has shown, the affirmation of a creation "out of nothing" would in India be perilous to the absoluteness of God.

of my soul. He could say with Augustine, God is the soul of my soul; and as of my soul, so of all souls. These form in their total number the "body," the "soul" of which is *Iśvara*. Their relation to him is not identity, but by synecdochē they "are" God. As Luther explains the words: "This *is* my body, not in the sense of identity but of synecdochē, so far as "in, with, and under" the sacramental elements the body is included, so Rāmānuja treats the old doctrine, Thou *art* Brahman. And he may rightfully appeal to the many passages where in the Holy Scriptures of India the unity of God and the soul is indeed set forth, not in the sense of identity, but in the sense of God's soul-creating indwelling and permeation. God is here the "inner guide," who in mysterious connexion with it dwells deep hidden within it, and as such is the principle of its life, and in so far its "true self," but on that very account not identical with it, but in strictest distinction of being different from it. The idea of the immanence of one being in another real being replaces the idea of identity. This idea gives also to Rāmānuja's teaching the warmth of a genial mysticism, but one thoroughly personal. In mysterious relations of one being to the other, God dwells in the secret places of the soul itself unrecognized and unknown by it so long as it does not come to the redeeming knowledge of God. This connexion is a mysterious union of life with life; but it is never identity of creator and creature. Even in the perfect redemption of Heaven this limit will not be removed. In time

and eternity the creature remains distinct from the creator and redeemer.

> He who tarrying in the *ātman* is different from
> the *ātman*,
> Whom the *ātman* (so long as it is unilluminated)
> does not know,
> Whose body the *ātman* is,
> And who inwardly guides the *ātman*,
> He is "thine *ātman*," the inner Guide, the
> Immortal.

By this passage of the *Bribadaranyaka*, Rāmānuja, so to speak, neutralizes the saying of Chāndogya: *Tat tvam asi*, 'Thou art That.'

True, Rāmānuja does not know the Christian doctrine of creation out of nothing: the creature to him is not merely *through* God, but also *out of* God. But, as already said, this is never in his mind a reason for giving self-existence or divinity to the world. For him and for Yāmuna the reason for valuing it is not that it is *out of* him, but that it is the likeness of the infinite and immeasurable glory of its Creator. And this thought is so emphasized that the first almost disappears in consequence. The world's "pettiness," not its divinity, is emphasized. Thus Yāmuna says:

"The saying, 'Brahman has no second,' affirms that there neither was, is, nor ever will be any one who—as an equal or as a greater—could be added to him. For this entire world is nothing but a tiny droplet of the display and development of his might, yes, the drop of a drop from the ocean of the glory of the majesty

of Vishnu. Who could with the knuckle of a finger measure the oceans of the earth? And yet they are, all seven, only a droplet of a single bubble in the immense flood of the myriads of worlds (which themselves are nothing but the drop of a drop of Vishnu's glory)." [1]

Such saying reminds us of Isaiah's figure of the "drop of a bucket" (here infinitely enlarged). And no doubt this figure of Isaiah gives us the tendency of the Christian doctrine of creation from nothing really much more accurately and clearly than the doctrine itself, the tendency, that is, to produce the feeling of the total submersion of the creature, so far as its independence is concerned, in contrast with the Creator. That this is the tendency of the Indian teachers also is shown by the fact that there is alongside of the expression "body of *Íśvara*" another, "*Íśvarasya śesha*." *Śesha* means "remainder," and is used when the complete insignificance, dependence, and conditionality of an X with reference to a Y is to be indicated. The "remainder" of a thing is that which is left over when the thing has been subtracted from itself, that is, nothing. The bhaktas' doctrine of the world comes thus in fact as near the doctrine of creation out of nothing as is possible from Indian premises; and particularly here we have the case of that "convergence of types" of which I have spoken in my book, *Vishnu-Nārāyana* (pp. 203 ff.).

[1] The number of worlds created by Vishnu is infinite.

A STRUGGLE FOR GOD

We close this section with another passage from the *Siddhitraya* of Yāmuna :[1]

> This world of time, on account of its incomprehensibly manifold arrangements, and because it exists through, and rests upon, the infinitely wise One, was created as his glorious *image*, and is therefore to be termed the place of the manifestation of his glory. Hence it is, as a whole, to be ascribed to him, the One, as his "remainder," and so to be named.

[1] *Cf.* my article : "A piece of Indian theology," in the *Zeitsch. für Theol. u. Kirche*, 1929, p. 263.

THERE is another thing even more important than this clear and definite course of reasoning regarding God. It is that here we are dealing with a *genuine religion* and *religion of experience*. Religion is here no mere fringe of sentiment furnishing a border to the rest of our life, but is conceived as the true meaning of life itself. With this is connected a trait which is characteristic of the later theology of this religious communion: the properly speculative questions recede more and more, and the direct questions of practical religion come forward, questions regarding salvation, what is connected with it, and how it is attained. The most important points we must now consider.

A. x. As in Christianity so also in bhakti-religion, the distinction between a worldly and a spiritual life arises, and the most strenuous demand is made that men should give up the worldly life and seek the spiritual in the service of *Iśvara*. An old tract of the *Vaishnavas* distinguishes antithetically between what we may term the type of "the natural man" and that of "the spiritual man." The former is he who observes the forms of religion for the sake of

worldly success, and labours for this, or it may be for freedom from pain, and for "the deliverance from suffering" in the *nirvāna* of Brahman or Buddha. Such a religion strives at what is not worth the getting, and is a surrender of the infinite and imperishable. It is nothing but darkness. But the other religion is light; and is that religion acceptable to Bhagavat. It has

> *Nārāyana for its goal, its name is the Bhāgavata-*
> faith,
> For, goal and means is Vishnu sole,
> To him directed is pure work to be performed,
> That love may spring therefrom.
> If it has risen to him, then the work of love will be
> The work of highest culmination.
> The work of truth it is called,
> Developing to highest pitch of love.[1]

In this religion as with us there are told and collected narratives of conversions, conversions of worldlings, of the licentious, robbers, panders, and heretics, who before went other and evil ways, so as to cast away all these things for the service of Vishnu. Here, too, there are revival sermons, and pressure to produce decision, and decision here and now, before it becomes "too late."[2]

2. This pressure culminates in laying emphasis on "one-pointedness," or "singleness of aim."[3] This means, first, acknowledging Vishnu as the only true God. For, of course, *Īśvara* is

[1] *V. N.*, pp. 68 ff. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 56 ff.
[3] *Einspitzigkeit, ekāgratā.*

alone God and Lord. And he is also a zealous, jealous God, who will not share his own divine honour with others. That means the theoretical and practical acknowledgment of monotheism.

But this "singleness of aim" fares here as did monotheism with the old prophets of Israel. It is of almost greater importance to them that Israel should serve this God with the *whole heart* and the *whole soul* than that Jahveh is the one God. He demands the entire soul with all its powers for himself and his service, and in the soul nothing must rule but he alone. So Luther explained the first commandment of the Mosaic code. He does not discuss in his interpretation the demand of abstract monotheism, but the demand that men should fear, love, and trust God *above all things*. And just that is the sense, in this Indian religion also, of the demand of "singleness of aim."

This intensification of monotheism is especially to be noted in the instruction which Rudra imparts to a king who wished to know what really this strange "singleness of aim," of which the Vaishnavas talked so much, might be. Rudra answers at first with the doctrine of the strictest monotheism, but then continues thus:

Of single aim, O King, is he who gives up care,
As children do: They take no care for self or
health—"The mother cares!"
So trust in Vāsudeva they, so flee to him,
Stand firm in serving Bhagavat, and cast all care
on him.

He who white paints the swan,
The parrot green adorns,
The peacock's painted pride bestowed,
Will care, I know, for me.

Vishnu is God alone exclusive of all others. But this is only the background of the "singleness of aim." The thing itself is that he is the one of whom I lay hold with all the powers of my soul, so that I, as Luther has it, let myself down and submerge myself in him without reserve.

"To have a God means that I trust him with my whole heart"—so says Luther. The definition of a "God" would therefore not be "a highest Spirit," "a supermundane Being," not any other ontological thing, but "the absolutely trustworthy Being." And this definition would fit no other God better than Nārāyana, in the thought of his bhaktas. That is the meaning of the claim of monotheism, and further this, that this trustworthy Being becomes the lasting, unchanging substance of all the life of the soul, that he is conceived "with every power and with the whole soul" as the absolutely trustworthy one:

Whether I walk or stand, sleep or pray,
Whether I sing psalms, eat, drink, or what I do,
Always there dwells upon my tongue's tip this
one word,
This one, this worthy name: O Nārāyana!

3. One knows also in India that such perfect trust is not possible to the natural man, and that,

however much emphasis is laid upon one's own decision for Nārāyana and the life in his service, this decision and the change of the inner choice from worldly interests to his service, do not lie in one's own power, and cannot be merited by one's own work, that something must precede which lies in the will of no man, as the final and true reason of rescue and salvation, viz., the eternal election and the divine gift of grace:

> And how does one attain? No act, no human
> means procures it.
> It is the "causeless act," that has no cause in
> work of man.
> No penitence can liberate thy heart and no sub-
> mersion.
> Only by grace of Hari is it thine, without a cause.
> He whom His gracious eye foresaw when he was
> born,
> Comes swiftly to this "singleness of aim."
> 'Tis God himself elects . . .

And therefore, here also one knows and seeks illumination from above, which bestows the new power of sight, the heavenly eye:

> . . . and whom he chooses, him He gives at once
> Freedom from lust, and power to know. Thus
> guided,
> With heart and sense, to Him alone, the Self of
> all that is,
> One gains the highest place, the eternal home of
> Vishnu.

Or:

> *Question*: Say, who has taught thee that?

Answer: He himself who teaches all the world,
He, Vishnu, dwelling in the heart.
Who else could be a teacher,
But He alone, the highest spirit?[1]

4. On the other hand, the soul knows that the reason of her lost condition lies in her own original defect, in a *fall*, which precedes all single acts of wrong-doing and which is the secret of our whole existence in separation from God. God asks the soul whom he has brought home to himself in the heavenly examination before his throne:

Why, dear one, wert thou not here long ago?
Why didst thou tarry on the earth (in foreign parts)?
And for what reason wast thou chained in many bodies in the world (in thine endless wandering and straying in *samsāra*)?

And the soul must acknowledge:

Because I had forsaken unity with thee,
Because I, fool, had made my body me,
Because I did not know thee who didst dwell in me.
Therefore I wandered through raging Hells (and all other births).
To serve thee—that indeed my very being is (which I disdained).
Because I threw away my very self, I therefore was in chains.
But now (through grace) I have put off the natural man,

[1] *V. N.*, p. 47.

And have regained my true supernal self,
Which now is capable of serving thee.
But when was heard by Bhagavat this purpose
of the soul,
Of this surrendering, longing, fleeing soul,
Joy shone upon his countenance
Infinite saving joy, the goal of goals, the highest
of all goods,
For,—this is sure,—no higher good exists
Than this, the joy upon the countenance of God
(over a lost soul returning to its home and giving
itself to his service).

5. Here arises again the exhortation, as we should say, to make zealous use of the means of grace: to visit the temples of the Lord assiduously, to take part in his worship, to conform to the sacred sacramental and ritual customs, to keep oneself apart from the children of this world, to seek the assemblies of the pious, to hold edifying conversation with them, to avoid idle talk, to read industriously Bhagavat's word in the Holy Scriptures, to sing and learn the religious hymns, and to practise conscientiously daily worship, meditation, and reflection in one's own house.

6. He who thus truly serves *Ishwara*, experiences even now, and before the eternal redemption in heaven, blessedness in the Lord, in his service and his fellowship. The expression of this high feeling and joy of the liberated and redeemed soul is once put in the following deeply touching passage:

I say to you, however you may seek
In ups and downs of a wand'rer's world,

Rest will ye nowhere find, O sons of Diti.
And yet is rest in every place.
It is at hand: to SERVE HIM,—that is rest.[1]
What does he lack who has His grace?
Away with happiness, merit, desire!
These are too small for him who high aspires.
One fruit alone contents the breast:
That is the fruit on those bestowed
Who lingering not in earth's confusion,
Go home to the eternal wishing-tree.[2]

Or:

I praise him who of Word and Sense is the highest object.
I praise him who of Word and Sense is the only object.
I praise him who is above all measure high.
I praise him who is of goodness the immeasureable Sea.[3]

B. The most interesting thing in this religion is, however, the development of a group of problems in respect to the doctrine of salvation which corresponds to our own group in the most remarkable way, and might appear like a double of our own special Protestant problems of grace.

Salvation of the lost soul is the leading idea. This salvation depends upon *Íśvara* and upon communion with him. But how is it attained? Here arises the problem of the relation of *grace* to one's own *co-operation*, the question of

[1] "Peace" is rendered in the Sanscrit translation of the New Testament by the word which we here translate by "rest" more accurately.

[2] *V. N.*, p. 58. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 74.

Monergism and Synergism, the question regarding faith and works.

1. The question regarding "works" is an old one in the theological speculation of India. One must note, in the first place, that the points of departure there and in the West are quite different, and that we have to do here again with a gradual "convergence of types" from quite different origins. Back in the *Gîtâ* the question is discussed—and it is really the fundamental question in the *Gîtâ*—whether man should perform works or not. But this question is not discussed at first as a question of monergism or synergism, that is, of the co-ordination or subordination of works beside or beneath the divine grace. The ever-repeated meaning of Krishna's discourse is to urge on Arjuna to perform his "work," the "necessary" work which rests upon him as warrior and knight. The "Lord" offers himself to him as pattern, as the unwearied and active worker. And the demand of such work, of the necessary work, viz., that which is a matter of duty, is emphasized in the strongest way by the *Bhakti-mârga*. This attack is not directed against the front of the synergists: but is directed against the quietistic mysticism of the elder *advaita*-schools. These proclaimed that he who has come to the knowledge of unity with the Brahman ceases "work" entirely. He practises the *tyâga*, the casting off and abandoning of every kind of "work." He practises *sannâyasa*, the flight from the world of the wandering ascetic, who has no longer any need of ritual, ethical, or

other goals to be gained by works, and should no longer seek them. The world has no longer any existence for him, and hence all works, whether evil or good, have for him come to an end. Even Sankara accepted this doctrine, and puts himself to the greatest pains in his commentary on the *Gîtâ* to turn its doctrine topsy-turvy. The redeemed man, *i.e.* the man come to knowledge, he says, is on a higher level than works. No obligations bind him longer, no struggle by means of works for any positive goal occupies him. Workless, like the Brahman himself, he lives his life to its end, until his *karman* is exhausted.

The *Gîtâ*, and even the knightly religion of Krishna, enters the lists against such quietism, for action and for working according to the social position (*âśrama*) in which any one may find himself. And incidentally the *Gîtâ* adds that just such works are commanded and purposed by the Lord, and that the heroes of antiquity, like Janaka, by their working of the works required by their position in society, have gone the way of salvation. Rāmānuja in his turn contends at length and with emphasis against Sankara and against salvation without works. And the works prescribed by God stand in his mind side by side with grace.

2. But this situation immediately became another as the front was changed. And this was anticipated already in the *Gîtâ*. It proclaims in stirring words the doctrine from which as its germ develops that which we have called

the group of problems pertaining to "mere grace."

Thus we read at the conclusion (xviii. 64):

> Hear again the deepest secret, my sublimest word: Thou art dear to me beyond all measure, therefore will I tell thee what will promote thy salvation.
>
> Direct thy mind to me, love me, sacrifice for me, honour me. Thus wilt thou come to me. That I promise thee solemnly.[1] Thou art dear to me.
>
> Give up all religious usages (all ritual and other works and methods of seeking salvation), and find thy refuge *in me alone*. I will liberate thee from every evil. Be not anxious!

Here already works are not viewed as the proper way to procure redemption, but surrender of the heart to the rescuing and gracious God, and to his grace. And as soon as one becomes conscious of this problem, viz., the question, what leads to salvation, grace *or* works, there must be found, sooner or later, an answer that sounds quite differently. More and more clearly do we see the exclusively *gracious* character of *Iśvara's* redemption and rescue. Sharper and sharper the contrast becomes. The fundamental motives of the *Gītā* itself come to maturity. And now the confession of the verses already quoted is formulated:—

> And how does one attain? No human means procures it.

[1] The bhakta relies upon this "promise" just as Luther does upon the *promissio Dei*.

It is the work that has "no cause," which has no cause in work of man.[1]

"Without cause" is the grace which does not wait for the work of man, which does not wait for anything at all, but which precedes all work and service as pure *gratia praecedens et libera*. There is no *meritum de congruo* or *de condigno*. In India as among us, faith does not appeal to one's own worthiness or service performed, but the believer appeals to the word of gracious "promise," which the Lord has given in the *Gītā*.

3. Out of this motive the doctrine of the *bhakti* develops later in a surprising way. Bhakti is faith, filled with love, expressing itself in reverence. In the beginning it was regarded as the true means of salvation. But in the further development of the doctrine even this phrase comes under suspicion. Even bhakti is neither means nor reason nor condition of salvation. Grace is never bestowed for our faith, or our love, or our adoration. Bhakti itself is now looked at as a "work." And so bhakti is replaced by what in India is called simple "approach" (*prapatti*). Man is of himself not even capable of faith and love. There remains for him only one thing, to leave himself just as he is in the hands of the Lord, to surrender himself to him with all that he is, that he may do with him what he graciously will, and to leave to him to work alone and in everything. Of

[1] *V. N.*, p. 43.

"means" to salvation one can no longer speak. The "means" is entirely and solely *Iśvara* himself and his grace.

4. The school of Rāmānuja divided over these doctrines of grace into two separate schools, a northern school and a southern school, and there arose a bitter controversy about the exclusiveness of grace, which lasted for centuries and was not confined to the discussions of the theologians, but led to bitter actual hostilities between the two parties. The difference between these two schools was indicated by a drastic figure. They were distinguished as the ape-way and the cat-way. For, so they said, when a mother ape falls into danger, her young immediately cling fast to her, and when she makes a leap to safety, they are saved, by the act of the mother it is true, but in such a way that the young *co-operates* a little, because it clings to the mother *by its own act*. It is therefore a synergist. But when danger threatens a cat with her young, the mother-cat takes the young in her mouth. The young one does nothing for its salvation. It remains merely passive. All co-operation is excluded.

Eighteen chief differences between the doctrines of the two schools are specified.[1] Among them are the following controversial propositions:

The North says:

The divine grace is "earned" (viz., by one's own qualities, *e.g.*, bhakti, which man has to have).

[1] *V. N.*, pp. 160 ff.

The South says in reply :

Grace has "no price." It is free, and is also "irresistible."

The North :

Works and knowledge are, it is true, not the chief means of gaining salvation : but they "help" in attaining the redeeming bhakti.

The South :

Everything depends wholly on passive surrender to the Lord.

The North :

Passive surrender is *a* way to salvation (viz., for those to whom bhakti is too difficult).

The South :

Passive surrender is *the* way absolutely, the only way. Yet, properly speaking, the way is God himself, and even surrender can be called a "way" only figuratively.

The North :

He who can do nothing else, may choose passive surrender.

The South :

Try and see what thou canst do, and discover that thou canst do nothing.

The North :

Works, knowledge, etc., must "qualify" the passive surrender (*cf.* the *fides formata caritate*).

The South :

Works and everything of the kind "*dis*-qualify" only. The only help is that one is himself utterly helpless, but the Lord full of help.

The North :

"The works of him who draws near to God (the works *after* conversion) produce God's complacence and should be done with this in mind.

The South :

Even he who has drawn near (converted) should not imagine that he can please God. Not even he can "buy" (*merori*) God's grace.

The North :

Now then : The grace of God at least expects the surrender of the self to God.

The South :

That would be no surrender but a bargaining.—— Rather, God accepts out of his own free will, unasked and uncompelled.

The sum of the whole difference is :

The North : The soul gains God for itself.
The South : God gains the soul for himself.

IV

THE RELATION OF CHRISTIANITY TO THE BHAKTI-RELIGION

When one compares two religions or confessions with one another, he ought to avoid the mistake which Harnack points out, when he warns against comparing "one's own good theory with the other's bad practice," one's own ideal with the mere reality of the other. One must be as just at this point as is possible, must compare theory with theory, ideal with ideal, and, if he wishes to be absolutely just, he must not content himself with the view of the religion gained from the life of even its best representatives, but with that which would be gained if it should be really lived according to its last and best ideals. The religion under consideration has also the right to demand that one should not measure or evaluate it according to incidental, mere peripheral traits and conditions, which have actually always clung to it, and still cling, but could be eliminated without altering its essential character. One might find many a blameworthy thing in the present or in the earlier form of the bhakti-religion, for instance, the intimate combination with it of ancient myth and legend, the gross worship of

images, the unsatisfactory conquest of old social evils in the organization of society in India, the timid subjection to rites and ritual regulations which, as in Jewish ethics, have intruded upon the sphere of moral commandments. But Christianity, too, has certainly had in its own midst quite enough to do with mythology and legend, with popular superstition, magic and witchcraft, with mechanism and materialism and obsolete tradition, and has not to this day freed itself fully from such bondage. India has not hitherto had the periods of purifying enlightenment and critical sifting which we of the West have had. If it shall have them, many of its religious forms are certainly destined to receive criticism and suffer destruction, but the bhakti-religion will have no more to fear in respect to its deepest ideas from such criticism than our own religion when ridding itself of the forms and burdens of antiquity and the Middle Ages. "This flame will consume its own smoke"[1]—this process is already to be perceived in certain cases even in India, and the kernel and noble teachings of the *Gîtâ* will suffer thereby as little damage as does the gospel from the necessary change by the transformation of the contents of the New Testament into modern forms of thought by modern theology and modern Church life. Let us therefore proceed justly and look not upon the surface or upon chance expressions, and not upon defects due perhaps only to unfavourable situations.

[1] A saying of Goethe.

One can proceed in making such a comparison from two different points of departure: on the one hand from that of the "history of religion," on the other from that of "theology." Theology is not a history of religion, it is—in all religions which have developed a theology—a function of religion itself, and is not something outside of it, but arises from the necessities of the very nature of religion, and proceeds from within it. It is not a collection of propositions developed by the methods of profane science, but of formulations of religious faith, even when these are critical judgments of one's own, or of an alien, religion. Its fundamental category is that of "revelation," in India as well as among us. On the other hand, in the "history of religion," this category is not employed or known. The effort there is to comprehend and explain the "religions" in the same way as one does, let us say, the phenomena in the department of science or art, as the peculiar productions of the human spirit in the course of the history of human civilization. Now it is from both points of view that one finds comparison and reference possible, and in both may be recognized analogies, and greater or less similarity and kinship, as well as tension and opposition.

A far-reaching similarity to Christianity in the bhakti-religion in its different fields has often been recognized by theologians—in Japan, for instance, in reference to the reverence paid by the bhaktas to the gracious and saving Buddha Amida. A zealous native Japanese missionary

who was devoted to his missionary work told me about his aged mother, who greatly reverenced Amida. "She too trusts the saving grace given from above, and is at peace, and content with her faith. She refers it not to Christ but to Amida. Ought I to disturb the peace of her old age for that reason and by suggesting doubts, endanger her faith, which, after all, has the same real meaning as ours?" In India I met another Christian missionary who, with true Christian zeal, was labouring for the lowest and lost and ostracized. He took out of his pocket a New Testament which had been read to pieces, and with it another book, not less read, in which he was versed from word to word. It was the Bhagavad-gītā. And he said to me that he gladly and regularly began with this book, and with its words, which were familiar to his hearers, before speaking of the parables and words of Christ. Indeed, the proposition has been made to concede to Indian Christians that in their special position this and other holy books might occupy the place which for those who have come out of Israel the Old Testament does, as books of prophecy and introduction to the New Testament.

I would not venture to contend with men of wide experience, who are far above me in practical judgment, about their practical methods. And just as a theologian do I feel most strongly what presumption it would be to affirm of men like Yāmunamuni, Rāmānuja, or of the profoundly pious and reverend representatives of Indian religion to-day whom I was permitted

to meet, that their faith was a "creation of the human imagination." I see rather that our theology lacks categories for the evaluation and comparison of other religious types with our own. But on the other hand it seems to me at any rate that even the mere "historian" of religion, if only he is in position to distinguish typical elements and peculiarities of any religion, must enter protest against the idea that the *Gītā* and the New Testament could seriously sustain the relation which the prophecy and Psalms of Israel have to the New Testament. He would be compelled to point out, in his own technical vocabulary, the inner "difference of structure," descending to fundamental principles, which has its origin in specifically Indian points of departure, and is maintained throughout the development of Indian religion, and even in the bhakti-religion. And this is in a religious way felt by Indians themselves. I recall the example of Rāmabai, the Christian "saint" of Poona, who is reverenced as a *sādhvī*, even by the Indians.[1] After long seeking she became a Christian. She had, as a highly educated daughter of a Brahmin, known all the heights and depths of Indian piety. In her home the bhakti-religion flourished in especially attractive form on account of the wonderful, delicate, and spiritual songs of the Mahārāshtra saints. And Rāmabai was herself as a Christian truly devoted to her country in self-sacrificing service to its orphans and widows. But she saw no "preparatory stages" in her

[1] See *Pandita Ramabai*, Dr Nicol Macnicol, Poona.

former faith. Indeed, she attempted to produce a translation of the Bible of her own, in which she studiously rejected the general custom of translators to employ the current vocabulary of Indian religious terms, and sought out, or constructed, strange forms of expression in order to prevent any association with Indian ideas. And I met with corresponding convictions on the non-Christian side. True, one often finds that Indians, like the follower of Sankara mentioned above, conceive of Christianity as pretty much identical with their bhakti-religion, and acknowledge Christ as an *avatāra*; yes, are even ready to employ occasionally biblical words and forms of prayer. On the basis of this fact a religious service was to be arranged, at a recent congress of religions, which should reach its highest point in the repetition by the audience of the Lord's Prayer, in which, it was said, East and West meet, for both would certainly acknowledge "the common fatherhood of God, and the brotherhood of man." This arrangement was, however, felt to be inadmissible not only by Christians but also by just those earnest and educated men of India who occupied a position by no means hostile to Christianity, on account of the implications of their own religion. They felt that the Lord's Prayer is a Christian prayer, but not at all an Indian prayer or a universal prayer which a convinced native of India might adopt without hesitation. And they protested from the standpoint of their own religion against such syncretism.

I say, it must seem even to the historian of religion a "stylistic" or "structural" impossibility to introduce the Lord's Prayer into the *Gītā*, or to declare the *bhakti-mārga* identical in idea with the Christian *ordo salutis*. Even he must declare that, in spite of all analogies, the religion of India turns upon an altogether different axis from the religion of the Bible, and that the two cannot be regarded as "preparation" and "fulfilment," or as the preparatory stage and the stage of completion, as is the case with the Prophets and Psalms in relation to the gospel, but that the passage from the one to the other religion involves a complete displacement of the axis, a *saltus*, not an evolutionary and gradual transition. I have pointed this out already at the close of my book, *Vishnu-Nārāyana*, and at the same time commented on Schleiermacher's conception of the "individual" element in religion. This conception of his is certainly insufficient for a theological discussion, but it is enough for mere comparison of religions, if not universally yet to a great extent in regard to the religions we are now comparing. He says that it is not the greater or smaller quantity in single religious ideas that makes the difference between the different types of religion. On the contrary, the quantity might be the same in quite different religions. But everything turns upon which of such ideas is the determining *centre* of them all. Regarding the single religious ideas, there is in fact a far-going agreement between our two religions, extending to those

doctrines which we are accustomed in Christian dogmatics to regard as characteristically Christian, the doctrines of the hypostases, of the incarnation, the valuation of the "word" as the proper source of religious knowledge, grace, election, strict exclusiveness towards other types, etc. All that is indeed to be found in India. And yet, the "spirit" of the two religions is different. It is so in fact because, in the case of both, other ideas occupy the centre, by which arises that "displacement of the axis" of which we spoke, and by which it further happens that certain ideas of the one are only fragmentary, and in part lacking in the other. And we shall also see that the figure of the "other axis" is not sufficient.

"Different spirit"—we said. Difference of spirit is experienced in the first instance by "feeling," and not conceptually. And so it is in fact when one comes from the *Gītā*, and has "felt" its spirit, and returns to our Psalms and Prophets, to the gospel and to Paul. One *feels* that there the spirit of India breathes, here the different and, let us say at once, the incomparably more piercing and vigorous spirit of Palestine. But one can in this case give an intellectual account of what we "feel" here, and we will now attempt this in its chief features, arranging the differences in scale of growing importance.

1. We objected above to the assumption that the Lord's Prayer was a kind of universal prayer in which all religious people, at least those

theistically inclined, might unite as expressing what was common to them all. In fact, one would have to suppress and to strip off the whole historical meaning of the prayer and also all specific associations which attach to it, to blot out the prophetic inheritance of Israel, its special Palestinian and later-Jewish presuppositions, and finally its embedment in the spirit and meaning of Jesus' proclamation of the kingdom of God. That is to say, one would have to eliminate all the peculiar spirit of the prayer, and in a levelling fashion to bring it down to the low plateau of a theism altogether untypical—a procedure which in the very act destroys likewise the peculiar spirit of the other religions which one would try to include in common supplication. Already the opening address, "Our Father which art in Heaven," would strike one as strange if one should encounter it as the highest and most solemn address to the divinity of India. One would be startled and feel the strangely foreign sound in these surroundings in spite of the fact that the name of Father or Mother for God are by no means uncommon in that land—so distinctly do we immediately feel the attending associations of these words. One would surmise in such case an interpolation. The most solemn address of the bhaktas to God, to which they return again and again, is *Purushottoma* = "Highest Spirit." And, as we shall see, the profoundest spirit of this religion is thereby expressed. The expression goes back to the "*purusha-sûkta*" of the

Rig-Veda. This old hymn is for the bhakta, with the *sāvitrī*, the most solemn of prayers. Now, to be sure, for us too, God is the "Highest Spirit"; but how strange would it seem to us, if any one should propose to us in India to join in using a liturgy in which, perhaps, our Lord's Prayer occurred, but which ended in the *purusha-sūktam* as the culmination and summation, as did the liturgy on the occasion above referred to, with our Lord's Prayer: or if one should put in its place the *sāvitrī* (the prayer to the *savitar*). It runs thus:—

> The adorable light of the *savitar*
> We meditate — of the God
> Who may speed our meditations.

Savitar, the God who urges on, is explained by the bhaktas as *Iswara* himself. And he is certainly to them the one eternal God himself. Now, certainly the entire substance of such a prayer might occasionally be taken into use by a Christian. But then it would be transferred thereby into a thoroughly different sphere, and such a transfer a genuine bhakta would undoubtedly resist as much as a Christian would the transfer of the Lord's Prayer into the Indian sphere.

Entirely impossible, however, in Indian surroundings would be the second petition, "Thy kingdom come," which comprises in itself the very gist of the whole prayer.

This is the case, of course, only when the phrase "kingdom of God" is taken in its

original biblical sense, and not in a shallow modern sense. The idea of the divine kingdom has had to put up with a great deal! And to-day it is again in danger of losing its genuine stamp when, for instance, it is said that the kingdom of God is not anything "chronological," it is only the "demand" on the individual for a "decision." Such a thought would indeed not be alien at all to Indian thinking. For, there as well as here, the life of every one is subject, as we have seen, to the "demand" to decide for "the Lord" in preference to the life of the world. And here, too, the coming judgment before the throne of God stands threateningly before every one. Here, too, the preacher urges to a "decision" which the individual has to make regarding his life, and that the rightful decision. But the kingdom of God in the Prophets and the gospel means something much more and much greater than a mere demand for a decision by the individual in view of an eventual judgment. The "coming" kingdom of God is first and chiefly that which the name indicates, the mysterious fulfilment and the goal which God has chosen, viz., the last and final establishment of the "*mal'kut Jahweh*" over everything and all things and over the world itself. It is the realization of his reign, which he will bring in at a time which he alone knows, when the world will be in truth the kingdom "of God and of his Christ." This idea, without which Christianity is no Christianity, is by no means a universal religious good, and no good

belonging to the religions of India, but a quite specific good, and in fact so very specific that the question here is not anything regarding any mere displacement of axis, but rather regarding a central idea that is *lacking* in India, yes, is contrary to the type of piety to be found in India. It has its roots in the soil of the old and specifically different prophecy of Israel, of a "day of Jahveh," when he will come to erect his kingdom in his people and in the nations, when "righteousness" shall cover the land like water, and when at last that for which the fathers hoped will become *real*.

2. That includes a very essentially different God from that of India. *Ishwara* thrones in his eternity. Deep beneath him rushes the stream of the world and humanity in *samsâra*, in ever repeated circles of woeful birth and rebirth. In this world the wandering soul strolls, separated from *Ishwara* by its fall and lost in the confusion of the world. Then he inclines to it in pure, undeserved grace. Out of the infinite number of the lost, he raises his own to himself. But this world of wandering rushes and runs on from one æon to another. Never does it become the abode of the glory or the honour of God. It remains ever what it is, a *lîlâ*, a sport of the Deity, a concatenation without goal and end—true, not without objective existence, but eternally worthless, never arriving at a fulness of worth, never *glorified* and made an abode of the kingdom and of the final dominion of God himself.

Israel's prophets, quite contrary to this, were much less interested in the "rescue," and that the rescue of the individual. The central point of their preaching is this, that Jahveh's kingdom ought to be, and, alas! is not, but that at the appointed time it will be, in spite of resistance and disobedience on the part of his people, carried on through judgment and flaming wrath to the consummation. And so thought the young Christian community also. God's kingdom *will come*: this they knew, and in glowing expectation of the advent they stood, and hoped, and waited. The expectation of the advent,[1] in humble reserve and in supplicating expectation in view of the final breaking forth of the "wholly other," is the soul of this religion[2] from the days of the original Church on—an attitude of the soul altogether unknown in India. And however great a change the character of the piety of ancient Israel undergoes, as appears in the Psalms and the Gospels, so that instead of being the piety of a people in its collective aspect, it takes on the individual and subjective

[1] *Adventsgefühl.*

[2] Emanuel Linderholm has the right understanding of the meaning of our religion when, in his new book of lessons for the Christian Year, he selects passages on the *Creation* as lessons for the Advent. The whole doctrine of the Creation would have little interest for us Christians, if it were not the preparatory act of God's "Coming," of his last and final advent. See in respect to this what follows, and Linderholm's *Das Jahr der Kirche*, L. Klotz, Gotha. The expectation of the καιρός, the moment of the "irruption" from above of judgment and the establishment of the kingdom, and the desire to explain the signs of the times from the point of view of the καιρός, gives to-day its especial note to the theology of Paul Tillich, and thereby he preserves, in spite of his surprising expressions about the "Superbeing" whose "symbolical word" God and Christ are, a decidedly more Christian position than many of his critics.

aspect, yet the first idea is distinctly maintained. There is here really prophecy and fulfilment, bud and blossom, preparation and realization. Christianity, too, gives precedence over the idea of simply individual beatification and rescue, to this whole great *objective* eschatological value—viz., that Jahveh's reign is certainly "coming," and will become real, and that the "end of all things" in time and eternity will be the realized "kingdom of God."

3. In immediate connexion with all this there are two differences between the East and West worth noting, which are only developments of what has already been said. I will first designate them by two usual names, which I shall later correct as insufficient.

(*a*) The students of comparative religion often present, as a noteworthy difference between East and West, that the piety of India is "world-denying," that of Christianity "world-affirming." This assertion means that, according to the Indian conception, the world is properly an unreal world, a product of mere *māyā* and of the cosmic "illusion" of *avidyā*; according to the Christian conception it is "real." This distinction is in the first place inaccurate, and secondly does not touch the most essential point. On the one hand, the fact is overlooked that also throughout all the Christian literature of edification there runs a vein of "world-denial." "A handful of sand, trouble of soul, fleeting, transitory, unstable, vain, yes, even a dream, and vain phenomenon of the sense"—thus have they of the

West many times judged the world, as well as those of the East. A radical renunciation of the world, and forsaking the world, are in Christianity also a first demand. On the other hand, that theory of the world as a mere phenomenon has been condemned in India by the teachers we have named as the veriest heresy. The doctrine is Sankara's but not at all Rāmāhuja's. Rāmānuja affirms the absolute reality of the world in the most decided fashion. He ascribes a certain validity to the *māyā*, but it is not in his view a deception, but the *creative* miraculous power of *Iśvara*, whereby he, the real One, brings reality into existence. Affirmation of the reality of the world is not what he lacks, but he does lack entirely the positive *evaluation* of the world, which, in spite of the expressions above cited, belongs inseparably to the essence of Christianity. India gives no genuine *worth* to the world because it knows nothing of a *goal* of the world. The world takes its course, but it is not being conducted towards perfection as a goal, or towards a "transfiguration," either because it is conceived as in evolution towards a goal, or because it is to reach such a goal by guidance from above. Rāmānuja may well say it is a *real* creation of God, who creates, sustains, and again dissolves it. But this creating, sustaining, dissolving, and re-creating is the *līlā* of *Iśvara*, his eternal "play,"[1] his play, which in consequence of his omnipotence is carried

[1] With the adherents of Śiva, it is the eternal cosmic "dance" of the divine Naṭarāja.

through, without opposition from any quarter, by his mere will, without instrument or means of any sort, which is also permeated with wisdom and beauty, but which as such exists only to pass constantly away again, and to arise afresh in endless and uniform repetition of itself. It is always at the end consumed by fire. But it is never "transfigured."

But the God of Palestine created these things, looked upon them, and saw "that they were good." Still more. The God of Israel, and still more the God of the New Covenant purposes and makes this world with an actual, immense, essential value, of which the Fall and the Devil can never rob it, viz., with the value of an incomparable aim, the aim to be the scene and object, not of God's own self-realization, but of the realization of his *honour*, viz., of his divine lordship, at the end of time, *i.e.* in the final completion which he will bring in.

It is evident that only here the conception of creation must become a true *necessity* to the religion, and has an origin quite different from that of India. In India it arises also, it is true, and also in a purely religious way, viz., from what Schleiermacher calls the feeling of absolute dependence. But it does not arise exactly from the conception of salvation, for it would be enough for eternal salvation with *Ishwara* that he has the power, like a heavenly fisherman, to fish out of the stream of misery individual souls and draw them up in his grace, as in a net, to himself. For this a *ruler* of the world were enough.

In fact some theistic schools not of the Vaishnava circle content themselves with this designation. The Christian God is, however, *necessarily* the creator of the world in consequence of the idea of salvation. Because all things are TO HIM, and because *all things* are to him, and not merely single souls, *therefore* must all things be THROUGH HIM and FROM HIM. In Christianity the creation by God is not derived from the mere idea of absolute dependence, but from the purpose of the creation, that it should become the place and scene of the honour of God in "his kingdom."

(*b*) And further: Augustine once asked himself what he really wished to know, and his soul answered: *God and the soul. He asked again:* Nothing else? and it answered: Nothing at all. The sense of this passage is that religion is here conceived exclusively as a relation between God and the soul, abstracting from everything else, from the world and surroundings and fellowmen. This point of view is "acosmical" in the sense that here, looking at the world in a purely religious way, one abstracts from everything but the relation of the individual soul to its God.

As a formulation, consciously one-sided, such an utterance may be possible for Christians, and it is also quite serviceable that this element should be emphasized on occasion in blunt one-sidedness. But if it should *remain* in the one-sidedness, it would in fact be Indian and not Christian.

The *bhakti-religion also recognizes that* he who has found Vishnu and has attained salvation, has a new and other relation to the world and

his fellow-men than before. There are striking expressions of this kind. Nanjiyar, one of the *ālvārs*, said: "There is a sign by which one can know whether a man is religious or not. If a misfortune befalls another, notice whether thy heart is moved with sympathy for him or not, whether it suffers pain with him or the opposite. In the former case thou mayst be certain that thou art in filial relation with God, in the latter that he rejects thee." That reminds us of 1 John iv. 20—"If a man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar." And yet there is a significant difference. For the meaning of the Indian expression is only this: *if* we are in a world of fellow-men, then it will be as described. But *that* we are in a world of possible relations to others, and must be so in order to serve God at all, is by no means demanded. To be sure, the meaning of the redeemed life according to the bhakti-teaching is, as we have seen, the *service* of God, and tirelessly this is set forth and praised as the highest, last, and only good. But this service might be rendered if none but God and the individual were concerned. It demands beyond these two no *object* and no *sphere* in which the service should be rendered. But such a sphere Christian service to God *necessarily* involves, and for this a world of fellow-creatures. In almost blunt fashion is this expressed when John proceeds in the passage above cited to say: "For he that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how CAN he love God whom he hath not seen?" as if he would say: Only the love

which has been exercised and proved regarding the visible can rise to become love to the invisible. Certainly for Christians all service to God would be imperfect if it were not exercised towards objects which, because equally with myself objects of the divine purpose, afford me a sphere of service and the possibility of substantiating my will to render it. To the Christian, the world of men and things external to himself and about him is *indispensable* as the sphere of his service. And even our perfection in heaven we can think of only as the "*communion of saints*," in which our perfect love to God is also love to men associated with us in redemption and salvation. —And what is thus true of the human world of men and things is true also in the wider meaning of the "world" in general, so far as it is the sphere and object of God-designed service.

4. Ritschl, in his famous figure of the ellipse, made a suggestion in this direction: the religious relation—he says—between God and the soul is not to be compared to a circle with only one focus, but to an ellipse with two foci, God and the world. But what he means thereby needs supplementing. He means that my relation to God gives me power to *overcome* the world. Now such a formula might be repeated in this sense quite appropriately by Indian theologians also, whether they were of the mystic-monistic school or bhaktas. According to the former, God, viz., the eternal Brahman, and the salvation which he confers, is precisely that by which the "world" is *overcome*. And the pressure of a world which

is to be overcome, and deliverance from it, are hinges upon which this and other mystic religions turn (an element which Ritschl in his contest against mysticism has overlooked). The theory of salvation held by the *advaitins* is in this sense quite "elliptical": the evil in the world is *samsāra*, and liberation from it by the *ekatā*, the identification with that which is entirely supermundane, is the great theme of this religion. And just so in bhakti-religion. However far it is removed from the impersonal Brahman, however strong its affirmation of the reality of the world, the world is for all that, in like measure, only an "enchainment" from which to be delivered. It never arrives at that evaluation of the world which we hinted at under 3 (*a*): quite as little at that understanding of the world which we had in mind under 3 (*b*). This is a still deeper and stronger understanding than that under 3 (*a*). It affirms that the world, as the world of our fellow-men, has for us the immeasurable value of being the sphere of service to the divine will.

Doubtless it would be one-sided again if we should affirm that Christianity recognizes only one form of service to God, viz., service to one's fellow-men. There is also truly a service to God, when the soul is alone with God, when everything about it, even humanity and individual men, disappears, and this most when its thoughts are turned to itself alone, when it stands before God with its sin and guilt to submit it to his judgment and to experience his grace. It can and should serve him in praise, prayer,

devotion, and meditation, when little attention may be given to any relation to others. But if this were always so, that would be a malady of the soul, a malady which is not confined to a "mystical attitude," but can equally exist in relations of simple faith, love, and reverence towards God.

Such evaluation of the world as necessary for the believer in the sense of a necessary sphere of genuine and complete service, has—as we already mentioned—further reference not only to the world as the encompassing world of humanity, but further yet to the real world in general and to its course of events. The Christian needs the world, as a complex of events, for the sphere in which he tests himself by cross, exercise, discipline, for the school of faithfulness in service. He needs it still further as the possible material on which and in which to fulfil God-given tasks which are recognized by his ripening perception of values, quite independently of one's neighbour's weal or woe and of any service to his neighbour, *e.g.*, as material for that which we call in secular ethics tasks of general culture and civilization, may they be tasks of the individual or of communities. This appears in the growing and more complete development of the Christian's sensitiveness to values. Even Paul goes far beyond the works of simple love and the values of personal purity of heart (which have the chief place in the preaching of the prophets and of Jesus), to embrace in his list of values in Phil. iv. 8: "Whatsoever things are honourable,

whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report, if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things." The recognition of labour as a God-designed form of human activity belongs here (2 Thess. iii. 10). It is placed by Benedict in his motto, *Ora et labora*, side by side with the spiritual service of prayer, worship, and meditation. That the appreciation of labour not only as an ascetic instrumentality but as a valuable "sphere" for the exercise of obedience is involved in this motto, one may see in the contrast with India, which understands well enough the ascetic value of labour, but not its nobility. And this is the same also with Luther's appreciation of the "calling" of the common man as the proper and appointed sphere of the "new obedience." It is in the same line when, in the ripening understanding of values, individual and collective labour in the rational shaping of human relations in general meets with recognition, and when the shaping of social, educational, scientific, and other cultural aims is acknowledged as a problem, and felt and declared to be an affair of conscience for the Christian and for Christendom. Social and cultural ethics is necessary to a developed Christianity, and Thomas Aquinas shaped it on a great scale. The theologians of the bhakti-religion never did think of these things and never could by any impulse of their religion.

5. Not only Christians, but also Hindus as well, have seen the differences between East and

West which exist at this point and have arisen from profound inner necessity. The relation of such Hindus to these things is of a threefold kind. They either feel the difference—and with this I have often met—lament their lack, and as men of the times, turn critically against their own tradition. Or they seek to enlarge their tradition by interpreting it in such a way as to incorporate in it what without doubt does not belong to it. But there are also cases, thirdly, where the difference is recognized and the Indian position consciously *affirmed*, and emphasis laid upon precisely what from our point of view is a defect, as a decided superiority of the East over the West. Their answer is this: "That is just what at bottom separates you from us. You want 'morals,' 'ethics,' 'culture,' and so on. But we 'are above it,' for we want more and quite different things. We want 'salvation' and nothing but salvation. We want to serve God and him alone, not any cosmic purposes beside or with him whatsoever."

Such service of *Îśvara* is made in the bhakti-religion the object of rigorous consideration. They say: the service of *Îśvara* is twofold. First, it may be like the service of Bharata to his lord Rāma.[1] Bharata performed the will of Rāma in complete readiness to serve even to the surrender of all his own will, not asking, from pure readiness to serve, for a "reason"

[1] When Rāma was compelled to leave Ayodhyā, his brother, Lakshmana, followed him into poverty; his other brother, Bharata, remained, at Rāma's wish, at home.

for it (*for* example, the purpose of what was commanded), or for the "fitness of the command" (because of an inherent value of that commanded). Or, secondly, the service is like that of Lakshmana, who did not remain at home but accompanied Rāma in closest companionship upon his wanderings. His service is distinguished from that of Bharata in that it did not consist merely in the simple act of obedience but was also performed in unbroken fellowhip with the Lord. But the service of *both* is alike characterized by being a bare subjection to the divine "claim" without their knowledge and recognition of an independent sphere of meaning and value, as for example the sphere of love of neighbour, of one's calling, of labour, or any other sphere whatever. It could be rendered if the thing commanded were absolutely senseless and worthless, as to stand on one leg for a thousand years, or to spend an eternity in contemplation of God, utterly separated from all fellow-beings. It "needs" no world at all, and does not value it. That means, however, that the purely "numinous" worth of the will of God is alone recognized, as *form*, the *matter* being purely accidental. It is not a recognition of the worth of the "Holy," who appears only when the numinous-irrational *form* is filled out with rational *matter*, which is given by autonomous moral valuation.[1]

6. I am quite ready to grant, yes, I will even emphasize the fact that I am here caricaturing

[1] See R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 116: the Idea of the Holy as a complex category.

to a certain extent. And I will immediately add that I am decidedly opposed to the assertion, often made by Indologists, that the Indian religion, if not "immoral," is nevertheless "non-moral." This is not true even of the extreme Indian mysticism. Whenever this is presented by its genuine representatives they take it as a matter of course that he who has attained redemption is by that very fact lifted above the "lusts that war against the soul," above passions, impurities, etc., and that he will carefully avoid all harming and injuring others, that he will be found benevolent, friendly towards others, that he will be "*anyasya hite ratah*," that is, happy in their well-being, and that all this will be involved in his mystical experience. And I have, in my *West-Östliche Mystik*, p. 162, set forth the admirable ethics of the *Bhagavad-Gītā*, which are proclaimed and demanded in the name of the personal *Iśvara*. There can be no doubt that the nobility of self-prompted loyalty, benevolence towards mankind and every living creature, chastity, marital faithfulness, and all that whereof "there is any virtue, and any praise," is deeply felt in India and brought before us in shining examples. In the Rāma-temple in Nāsik we listened to a sermon which presented the duty of veracity, even to the extent of the sacrifice of life, by an old example from an Indian Purana, with absorbing interest and visible impression upon the audience But the distinction which we have already drawn remains a valid one: "If thou art in a world of fellow-creatures, the law

of Îsvara holds there, and holds as his demand of thee." But the meaning is not this, that the existence of a world and the relations established thereby are *essential* to serving *Îsvara*. And when the various features of the "*kaimkarya*," which pious men have to render to their God, are described by the poets and bards of bhakti, the real essence of the service consists in thanksgiving, praise in psalm and sermon, meditation, worship, the lifting of the soul to God in love and trust, exercises of devotion, etc., that is, things which continue to exist even if the soul views itself as alone with God, without including our relations to our neighbours or the world.

India, too, has its "golden rule" of right intercourse with our fellow-men: "One ought not to do to another what would be disagreeable to himself."[1] But significant is it that the *positive* form of the golden rule as Christ, outstripping that, has formulated it, is *not* found: "Whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye also unto them." It is still more significant that all demands of *ahimsâ* and *maitri* which enrich the Indian ethics, are far behind the energy and almost naïve assumption that, of course, in the great commandment of the gospel to love, the love of God is *inseparably* attached to the love of one's neighbour. The service of God is not conceivable without this sphere of realization, while to the bhakti-theologians the words: "The other commandment (viz., of love of man) is *like* unto it (viz., of love to God),"

[1] *Na tat parasya sandadhyat, pratilôman yad âtmanah.*

must seem nothing short of blasphemous. It must seem to them a belittling of God.

7. Perhaps a peculiar difference in the spiritual attitude of East and West, which we must at least touch upon, is connected with what has just been said. The lack in India[1] of interest in "history" (as we conceive it), which is more and more methodically cherished in the West, has been greatly criticised. This criticism should be decidedly modified, but there is some truth in it. Now, it would be incorrect to affirm that Christianity has, as such, an interest in "history," which, as such, is rather a secular conception. It is, however, true that it has always had an interest in explaining historical events somehow as the works of God. The historical narratives of the Old Testament are full of this. The effort to understand God's discipline of his people by judgment for disobedience, and the explanation of great historical events, like the appearance of Cyrus, as serving divine ends of salvation, lie in this line. This trait appears on a large scale in Augustine's great "philosophy of history," his *City of God* in which he seeks to explain the history with which he was acquainted, and especially that of the Roman Empire, by divine teleology. This is not interest in history as history, but certainly it is an interest

[1] Prof. Otto might have written "the Orient"; for the total lack of any canons of historical investigation, and of any sensitiveness in Semitic writers to historical truth or error is so evident that one is compelled to conclude that their strong interest in religious edification obscured to them the importance of intellectual accuracy and veracity. F. H. F.

in events as constituting a purposefully controlled and unified series. If this interest becomes secular, we have "history."[1] The idea of a teleology immanent in events then takes the place of a transcendent control, and finally this gives us a "coming-to-itself of the spirit," or maybe, the socialistic ideology of the "State of the future," or the "triumph of civilization." But these and like ideas the Occident would perhaps have never actually developed, had it not been for the impulse given from the beginning by the theological interpretation, by which the world, as God's world, has in fact the dignity of an ultimate destiny. And the indestructible confidence in the possibility of "rationalizing" the course of mundane affairs, and the ultimate victory of a social or universally cultural ideal, which even the "materialistic conception of history" of socialism implies, would scarcely survive, were it not for the antecedent belief that world, and humanity, and human relations are a possible, yes, a necessary sphere of the service of God.

8. Step by step we are descending into ever greater depths, for all that we have yet said does not reach the lowest with which we must now concern ourselves. In the "doctrines of grace" we found the most striking similarities. But just here we come upon the most profound difference of all.

Rescue of the wholly lost, as of those without

[1] Prof. Otto does not mean that it becomes such without a new interest in *facts* and *truth*. F. H. P.

claim or worth, not by their own power or merit, but by free, unfathomable grace alone—that they taught in India as well as we here. And what delicacy and depth, what degree of gratitude and blessedness this experience has reached yonder, the intimate hymns of India reveal. (In the most astonishing way it is revealed by the profound passage of Yāmuna's, which I have taken from his "Three-fold Proof," and given in the Appendix 5.) "But here, too, that which I have said above is confirmed: it will not do to take such words out of their connexions and associations, and from their original soil, and unthinkingly interpret them after our own way of speaking.

"Rescue of the lost"—of what is the Christian thinking primarily when he uses these words? He thinks and must think of rescue from the lost condition in sin and guilt, from the terrors of the conscience smitten by God and his holiness. But of what does the Indian chiefly think? He thinks in accordance with the whole Indian tradition, of rescue and release from the "bonds," viz., the bonds which bind him to *samsāra*, and their cords, from the misery of this world of wandering, and from the torturing "wheel of birth and rebirth," the wandering of the soul from existence to existence. Thus it is put in the "classical" theology of the extreme *Vedānta* mysticism, but so it remains in fact in the bhakti-religion.

This difference is central in so far as the question here pertains to that "changed axis"

on which, as their true centre, the two religions turn. One must express himself thus, for otherwise one would have given a wrong explanation, against which the Indian could easily appeal to utterances of his own holy texts. For, of course, the idea of sinful fault and the pressure of the conscience is not *lacking* there. There is no developed religion in which sin, forgiveness of sin, reproaches of conscience (and these the reproaches of the religiously governed conscience), do not play a part. Even Buddhism in its Mahāyāna-form has touching prayers for the forgiveness of sins, and confessions of sins against the eternal Buddha's or against the one original Buddha. The bhakti-religion is rich in such confessions. Yāmuna prays thus:

I am of sinful walk
That never ends, nor yet began,
Not to be stayed nor overcome,
A beast in human form, the seat of wrong.
O flooding stream of grace, O Father,
O sea of unexhausted goodness,
Hast thou as Krishna not
Had pity once on the Cedi-man,[1]
O gracious One, and given thy fellowship to him?
And insult him forgiven?
Speak! Was there not
With thee for his transgression room for grace?
When I now, all at once,
Come near thee, pleading "Thine I am": and then
Remind thee of thy oath,[2]
Dost thou to me alone deny thy truth?
Have mercy on me, charge me not with guilt.

[1] The King Śiśupāla who had grossly injured Krishna.
[2] In the *carama-śloka* of the *Gītā*.

At the same time it is true that *moksha*, the "release," undoubtedly denotes in India not merely the release from the enchainment to a transitory and suffering form of existence, but, when the "knots of the heart," by which man is chained to *samsāra*, are untied by grace secretly working within him, he is thereby immediately made free also from enchainment to a *worthless* and *unworthy* form of existence. For, as already said, we find here also a "conversion" (which here also is a *conversio passiva*) from an evil life to freedom from passions, from selfishness, and from the "*kleśas*" (which have bound the man to the not-divine, to the demonic existence of his former life), to the life of the bhakti inculcated in the *Bhagavad-Gītā*. Of this "Lady Bhakti"[1] a certain preacher, when seeking to describe her adornments, says:

Faith is her balsam, and listening to the stories of the Lord is her adornment. To meditate on him in her heart is her bath, which washes from every member the dirt of spiritual pride. Pity is her handkerchief, humility her garment, and constancy her perfume. The name of the Lord is her necklace, subjection to the Lord and his pious followers her earrings, and spiritual prayer her ring. The society of the pious is her eye-salve, and love (to the Lord) the purple salve of her lips.

And Krishna himself speaks this word in the *Gītā*: "Man is made of faith. As one believes, so is he"—and he continues: He who "believes

[1] Compare St Francis' "Lady Poverty," Dante, *Par.* xi. 74, 113. F. H. F.

in the evil life, becomes by his faith evil, but he who believes in the Lord becomes thereby like him." And Rāmānuja gives to the passage of the *Gītā*:

> He who clings to me alone and utterly (by *bhakti*)
> He is to be valued as a saint,
> Even when his walk is evil:

an explanation which might seem to approach our justification by faith. He says:

"How is that possible? Because of his firm confidence, by that *faith* which not every one can attain (because it is a gift of grace): the Lord alone is the Cause and Ruler of the world, my highest Lord, my Master, my Friend, and my greatest salvation. Such a (believing) man *is* indeed in fact henceforth a good and righteous man."

We see, it would be great injustice to the most intimate spirit of the bhakti-religion, if one should understand it as a simple eudaimonistic impulse to escape a world viewed "pessimistically" and its unpleasantnesses. One must not permit himself to be misled to such erroneous interpretation by Indian descriptions of the joys of heaven, as one must not in respect to Christianity by the huge clusters of grapes which our Papias promises us in our own Paradise. Bhakti and Nārāyana are the real good given by salvation. To be taken up by an incomprehensible, inexhaustible love, to become happy with the joy of beholding Vishnu's face, that is the salvation imagined.

And this is at the same time only the emotional consummation of a deeper value which is concealed in the pietism of the bhakti. Let me speak in a more detailed way about this. Underneath the cover of the emotional pietism of the bhakti there remains always—somewhat in disguise—the ancient primeval ideal of "*ātma-siddhi*." Should one ask the bhakta what was the most fundamental good which he sought, he would answer, "Release and realization of the *ātman* by, and in fellowship with the *paramaātman* himself." The doctrine of the individual *ātman* and of the eternal *Atman*, and the salvation of the one by the other—that is the ultimate aim of the teaching of Rāmānuja. The old idea of the *ātman* in ancient India was strangely cold; it is enriched by the bhaktas with emotion and vivified with the bhakti and its trust and love, which are emotional functions of the soul—a significant new element which, however, involves the danger of dragging down all too much the greatness of the original conception from its lofty plane of spirituality and—let us say it at once—of marvellousness, into the region of the surging and sometimes sentimental passions of the soul. What is the *ātman*? It is "Spirit," "Light," the complete antithesis of the unspiritual and dark *prakriti*, it is eternal luminousness. Yes, much more than all that, it is the incomprehensible miracle:

> One sees it as a miracle,
> Another speaks (only speaks, not having seen) of it as the "miracle."

A third hears of it as "the miracle" (and repeats the words).
But when many have also heard, yet no one knows it (by hearing, for only he who sees and experiences it, knows its marvel).

It is the most solemn term of the language of India, along with Brahman and *purushottama* themselves.

This *ātman* is, however, lost in *samsāra* by turning away from fellowship with the "highest *Ātman*." "Pressed together," become strange to itself, deprived of its wonderful dignity, it wanders in chains that have had no beginning. That it may be "redeemed," that it may come to its true nature and freedom, that--as one might say among us also - it may be brought home to its original condition, is the last and profoundest meaning of the saving grace and also of the bhakti: realization of the "self" in communion with the highest Self as the eternal meaning of its existence. That is also the meaning of the expressions: attaining the true *Sat*, ascent from death to *amritam*, guidance from "darkness" to "light," as one ancient prayer has it. And that is, as is always explained, not a mere "happiness," but "bliss." These original and profound conceptions of India have never been forgotten in the bhakti-religion. And they are always bursting forth from the ideas of its pietistic superstructure, which are sometimes altogether too anthropomorphic. If one might venture a prophecy, I would say that if there should be granted to this religion under new

spiritual conditions in India a new blossoming, the original vital force of such *ātma-siddhi* would manifest itself again without its overstrong emotional encumbrances. And the bhakti-religion in particular, with its *personal* conception of the *ātman* and the *parama-ātman*, will at such a time, when even in India person and personality will receive a higher valuation than formerly, have the advantage over the schools of the impersonal *Vedānta*.

Let us look at the other side. The Christian idea of grace is by no means exhausted by the justification of the wicked; it has traces of "*ātma-siddhi*" also. Home-bringing from the *misery* of the world, supermundane salvation not merely as obtaining "justification and sanctification" but also "blessedness," understood as "life and full satisfaction," spirit and personality enchained and to be released, rescue from the φθορά, from perishableness, bringing life and imperishable being, are essential parts of the Christian teaching also.

Indeed, there have been epochs in the history of the Church when, as in the old Church of the East, redemption from the φθορά, the effort to find a φάρμακον τῆς ἀθανασίας seemed to become the central idea. Those were certainly times of obscuration, not of illumination. But always "life," "real being" and "fulness of life," the terms of *ātma-siddhi*, are always necessary sides of the Christian salvation. Their true relation in a Christian sense Luther described in short and clear terms in his Small Catechism: "Where

forgiveness of sin is, there is *also* life and blessedness."

And so we say, we are not concerned with the *lack* of the idea of sin in India, or with the *lack* of the idea of *ātma-siddhi* in Christianity: but rather with an essential *transfer of the axis*.

"The axis of the search for salvation in ancient India was as it is given in its old prayer:

Lead me from *non-being* to *being*,
Lead me from darkness to the light,
Lead me from death to the superdeath.

But the fundamental motive of the religion of Palestine is given in the ancient word of Holy Writ:

Ye shall be *holy*, for I am *holy*.

That is: the *axis* of this religion is not *ātma-siddhi* but the Idea of the Holy.

By this is established a *typical* distinction of the two religions which is not removed or transformed into a distinction of degree by the fact that both religions have each the controlling ideas of the other as subordinate elements: the later bhakti-religion has profound ideas of forgiveness and intimate renewal, and the Christian religion profound ideas of soul and the life of the soul, of transitoriness, and of "that which endures forever."

9. With this is connected the fact which could not be discussed earlier, that the idea of "sin," although certainly not lacking in India, never has the depth and weight which it has in the

West. "*Quanti ponderis sit peccatum*"[1]—that never could be estimated with the same severeness in the East, because of the different intimate structure of the eastern religion.

In this regard it is instructive to note how difficult it is to give in Sanscrit a full equivalent for "sin," "repentance," or "confession," and how the word "rebirth" is everywhere in this language referred to something quite different from the "new birth by the Spirit." (*Punarjanma* means "rebirth" to the next bodily existence in the chain of the *samsāra*.) "Sin" is the usual translation for "*kleśa*." *Kleśa* comes from *kliś*, which means to "cause trouble." *Kleśa* is the trouble which the chained *âtman* has to suffer in the enchainment of *samsāra*. It is all the suffering and misery of existence in this world, of picturing which all Indian religions, including Buddhism, are never weary. *Kleśa* is in the official definition of theological speech especially the disturbance of the spirit by feelings of pleasure and pain which bind him, and from which the *mukta* is free. *Îśvara* himself is in the first instance *aklishta* (undefiled), because he is the absolutely "not-bound," *i.e.* not reached by the disturbances of feelings of pleasure and pain. The opposite of the "disturbance" of *kleśa* is properly not sanctity but serenity, rest of the liberated *ātman*, not disturbed or moved by the billows of feeling: and the *Âtman-Brahman* is the most serene rather than the most holy. True, this sereneness has also a quite transcendental,

[1] A word of Anselm of Canterbury.

irrational, "numinous" value, but a *sanctum* in our sense it is not. The same is true of the term *sat*, being, which is found in the old Indian prayer quoted above. "*Sad eva*," "being only," is the highest praise any one can give to the Brahman. Eruc, I have in my book, *West-Östliche Mystik*, pointed out that this is not only an ontological predicate, but that *sad* includes also a predicate of value. It is at the same time an *ideal*. But here again the confession, "Thou only art holy" (Rev. xv. 4), would be felt to be thoroughly foreign. Indeed, it would be quite untranslatable.

As regards "repentance" as a strong emotional experience of a "sinful" conscience, a Sānkhya as well as a *kevala-advaitin* would certainly see not disadvantage but superiority on his side. He would say: The value which you Christians lay on "repentance," on "sense of guilt," is anthropomorphic, and an introduction of elements of feeling or disposition, which may belong to human intercourse, or to the court-room, but which are a part of those very "disturbances" above which we ought to rise. "Terrors of conscience," the tortures of remorse, a broken heart—all that is itself *klesa*, of a "psychic" but not "spiritual" kind, belonging to the *manas* but not to the *purusha*; and they enchain and restrict man afresh and most severely. They all belong in the realm of the fettering cords which must be broken if the *ātman* is to come to its freedom. A bhakta would not say so: his religion acknowledges "emotions." His Lord,



Śankara

Iśvara is conceived as possessed of "all noble, ideal attributes," and they include emotions. But a special predicate, and a term like "holy," solely applicable to him, is not found even here.

The same is true in respect to the expression "*pāpa*." Garve translates this word in the verse of *Gītā* 13, 66:

> . . . Take thy refuge with me
> I will redeem thee from all *sins* (pāpa) . . .

He employs here this word of our Christian vocabulary, "sins," because he has none more exact and because it comes nearest to what is meant in the passage. But this is a case which illustrates the necessary defect of all translations: the foreign terms connote specific associations and tones which the words of one's own language and genius do not have, and thus they become inexact.

So the word "redeem"[1] for *muc* is inexact. True, the root *muc* doubtless denotes a making free,[2] a release,[3] and certainly it, like our "redeeming," means a "setting free" not in any mundane sense but in a metaphysical and merely religious sense. Still the difference from the Christian term is very great and quite obvious. We Christians think, when we use the word "redemption," of a release in the sense of an "absolution," a removal of the guilt of sin, and as a liberation from what is in contrast with holiness. Of such a redemption the *Gītā* says nothing. And therefore the "*pāpas*" of which

[1] *Erlösen.* [2] *Losmachen.* [3] *Lösen.*

the soul shall be freed here, are not "sin," in the stern sense of the burden of *guilt* which creates the pangs of conscience; and the "care" which Arjuna is to dismiss is not properly the "terrores conscientiæ" of which Luther speaks. Sankara in his commentary on this passage of the *Gîtâ* does not trouble himself at all to give the sense of these certainly deep words, but immediately endeavours to force upon them the entirely alien theory of the identity of the soul with Brahman. But Rāmānuja too is far from giving them the sense which we connect with our redemption and sin. He says, undoubtedly getting the sense of the passage correctly:

> I will free thee from all the "evil," which thou hast heaped upon thyself by endless doing of what ought not to be done, and omitting what ought to be done through beginningless time (of all thy previous existence), and which prevents thy coming-to-me.

'That of which he is here speaking is the dark inhibiting power of the *karman*, the "*vighna*," *i.e.* the *impediment* of "knowledge," which is at the same time an impediment to the breaking forth of faith, trust, love to *Îsvara*. 'This *karman* with its binding power, resting upon an original departure from *Îsvara*, is indeed an analogue to the ideas which our dogmaticians have sought to express in the mythological symbol of the "fall of Adam." For it includes also a defilement of nature of the inner man, a perversion, and a self-perversion. But the accent lies not

upon the "original guilt," but on the "enchaining power."[1] The *karman* of evil works and purposes is in the East the "power which *binds* all beings." No human power, no strength of one's own, can break this power of the *adrishta*. Only the eternal "*mukunda*," the giver of redemption, can, and he promises graciously to do this. Of course he proves thereby his compassionate goodness, his *karunā*. He graciously overlooks failures and their source. But that upon which the whole emphasis rests is the overcoming of the evil results of former works and of an incapacity for *jñāna*, and not the *expiating forgiveness of guilt* as the "greatest of all evils."

True, "original sin" is in Christianity too a "binding power," is inability, unfreedom, and helplessness. And redemption is here also a breaking of mighty fetters. But what is much worse than all helplessness is the burden of "guilt" itself. The *absolutio a peccatis* is here altogether the Alpha, and the "release" from the fetters is only the Omega to this Alpha. And according to Luther's deep insight, such release from helplessness is itself only the result and operation of absolution experienced and appropriated in the depths of the soul.

It is as we have said, and as Schleiermacher has indicated in his *Fifth Discourse on Religion*

[1] *Cf.* R. Otto, *Sünde und Urschuld*, fourth edition, 1929, Klotz, Gotha. An English translation of this book, by the title *Sin and Original Guilt*, is in preparation at the Oxford University Press.

(Sect. 85): the spirit of a religion is decidedly determined by the *axis* on which it turns, by the centre about which all the other religious ideas are grouped, to which they point, and from which they get their peculiar tone, and the whole obtains its individual structure. Two crystals can be precipitated from a solution chemically the same, but they may, on account of their different axial systems, and the difference of the laws of their crystallization, have *essentially* different forms and very different marks and properties. One may break them up and mix their substance, but one can neither reduce them to one another nor from the mixture of their parts produce a new crystal. As little can one by smoothing out the peculiarities of typical religions and by syncretism erect a genuine, new religion. For this reason Schleiermacher was right in his assertion that there is no "gradual" passage from one typical religion to another, but that a passage from one to the other can only be made *per saltum*. That is true of the relation of the bhakti-religion to Christianity. The change necessary in passing from one of these to the other is a deep, intimate change in the very axis, as is very clearly to be seen in the case of Rāmabai. It is performed always as a profoundly intimate revolution, even if the phases of the same cannot be plainly pointed out in the conscious life.

Goethe says, when he wishes to describe the secret of the individual form:

. . . und keine Macht zerstückelt
Geprägte Form, die lebend sich entwickelt.[1]

Lebend sich entwickelt, viz., "develops according to the law by which it has appeared."[2] He referred this, in the first place, to the shaping of the individual form of the living organism, and then to that of the spiritual individual. Perhaps his assertion is too one-sided: the shaping of the form of organic life is under new stimuli of a new environment, in fact capable of profound permutation, and cannot be described as the simple unfolding of a rigidly unchangeable potentiality. Certainly it is very one-sided regarding personal human beings, who by education, living influence, action from outside upon the soul, and particularly in the religious sphere by "grace" and "the new birth," are capable of transformations which in the "law of the planets" were not foreseen and by that law are not prevented. But he has *rightly called attention* to an original endowment which certainly reveals a form-preserving principle of continuity. And to these things there is an analogy in those great formations of a spiritual kind which we call religions.

The law with which the higher spiritual religion has "appeared" in India, and which in spite of the endless distinctions of schools, parties, and sects of India and of Buddhism

[1] . . . and no power dismembers
The implanted form which develops as it lives.
[2] . . . . nach dem Gesetz
Damit sie angetreten.—*Goethe*.

(flowing forth from India), is the fundamental principle of them all—this law is the undoubtedly deep and profoundly religious intuition of the *karman* (in connexion with the ceaseless rebirth in the series of the *samsāra*) and the *moksha-dharma*, *i.e.* the doctrine of the possible rescue from such enchainment, which in the bhakti-religion embraces the idea of a personal salvation in the eternal and blessed service of the loving *Íśvara*, by his rescuing *prasāda*. Its motto may be formulated thus :

> Ye are submerged in the world and enchained.
> But I will bring you forth.

Quite different with the religion of the prophets of Israel. Its foundation law has been given above :

> Ye shall be holy, for I am holy.

This is the "law" with which the religion of Israel "appeared." This principle is enlarged in the gospel by the idea of that God who *seeks* sinners, who reâppears as the God of free grace in Paul's struggle for "grace" against "law," in Augustine's struggle against Pelagius, in Luther's struggle for the remission of sins, for justification, by mere grace. But gracious is this God in so far as he "justifies and *sanctifies*. The axis remains always, even in its latest form, "conformed to the law with which it first arose."

Samsāra and *Brahma-nirvāna* gave rise to the problems of *bandha* and *moksha*. The preaching of repentance by the prophets of Israel gave rise

to the altogether different problems of righteousness. The God of the gospel is not one who rescues from "the wheel of becoming" (although this expression, as an obviously foreign-sounding hieroglyph, occurs a single time in James iii. 6), but one who seeks the *sinner*. And this conception of God was the principle of the "New Covenant," and it recurs undeniably, and as their fundamental significance, in both Paulinism and Lutheranism.

We state the contrast briefly (and with what one-sidedness is unescapable and necessary here):

Íśvara is a Saviour of those who suffer the torments of *samsâra*, and are strangers to their true home. The "Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" is the Saviour of the hearts broken by guilt, and of the consciences smitten by God's holiness.

10. These relations are peculiarly reflected in a difference of terminology. India also knows what the prick of conscience is. The word of the Apostle, that the law is written in the hearts of the "nations," and that consequently, even without the written law of Israel, they are "a law unto themselves," would be false were it otherwise. What we call conscience is in India comprehended under *sâkshin*, the "inner witness. *Sa-akshin* comes from *aksha*. *Aksha* means "eye" or "power of sight," *sa* equals "with." A *sâkshin* is in general the witness who, by having himself seen it, has a con-science of the deed of some one, and can therefore give "testimony" before a court. *Sâkshin* in

psychology is the Self as the abiding Ego (συνείδησις, *conscientia*), behind the course of the psychical processes, which possesses the consciousness of these processes. The ego knows, as inner *sākshin*, as inner observer, about his own circumstances, his feelings and decisions, as well as his deeds, good and bad. And this inner witness is also in these religions the dreaded accuser in the judgment of souls, and that a self-accuser. Now, our "Conscience" arises from a translation of the Greek συνείδησις, and this is, according to the root, in the first instance also a *general* conscience as to one's self. But who among us knows that to-day? The term "conscientia" has become fully independent. It would never occur to us to interpret συνείδησις in the New Testament, and conscience in its present meaning, as that general phenomenon of the knowledge of oneself. But in India they do that very thing. "Conscience" is *not* explained as a special and unique phenomenon, and therefore there is no term applicable to it alone. Even Yāmuna, when he begins his acute investigations of the *sākshin* in opposition to the Sānkhya's and the antagonistic Advaita-school, does not once mention the phenomenon of conscience as such.[1]

In this unpretending fact is reflected the difference which we will briefly indicate thus: Christianity is the religion of the conscience *per substantiam*, bhakti-religion that religion *per accidens*.

[1] *Cf.* my article on Yāmuna in the *Logos*, 1929, p. 169.

11. But even thus we have only imperfectly indicated the thing itself.

Christ, and in him God, has come to expiate our sins. Rejoice! O rejoice, O Christendom!

Thus the Christian Church sings in its Christmas hymn.[1] Christianity is more than a "religion of the conscience": it is the religion of the "expiated and reconciled conscience."

It is not the essential difference between Christ and Krishna and Rāma that he is a "mediator" only, for they were mediators too. Neither is the doctrine of the "incarnation" the special doctrine of Christianity. India possessed doctrines of incarnation long before Christianity. But that Christ was a "propitiator" is the profoundest meaning of his coming, and all speculative doctrines about his person derive their special meaning and the theological criterion of their validity from this fact.

I have elsewhere[2] spoken of the "expiation" in the biblical sense, and refer my readers to that

[1] *Cf.* the German hymn, "O Du fröhliche, o du selige."

[2] R. Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*.—This book had its origin in efforts to provide in my lectures for myself and my pupils an approach to the profoundest of all Christian intuitions which I perceived to be both indicated and concealed in the orthodox constructions of the doctrines of "reconciliation," and which did not seem to me to have been found in the essays of Ritschl on *Justification and Reconciliation*. I came to the result that "expiation" will not admit of a *theory* which shall express its profoundest reasons in the formal *concepts* of logic. But what I "conceived" was that we often in the depths of our souls "understand" what we do not "conceive" (*begreifen*), and about which we have no theory. As Luther says, "No one can *comprehend* God, but one *feels* him nevertheless." And it seemed to me that the biblical story of passion and the great passion, the tentative terms of the Gospels, Paul, John, and the Epistle to the Hebrews,

discussion. What there were to say more at length would surpass the limits of this essay. I hope to be able to carry it out at another time. What may be said now, and in connexion with the preceding, is *at the least* the following.

We said that *Îśvara* also "forgives," and men seek forgiveness from him. But his forgiveness is an *overlooking* of the fault, out of compassion for the *suffering* of the trouble which the faulty one has drawn down upon himself. It is *indulgentia*, compassionate leniency and indulgence, not, however, the Christian "forgiveness," with its far more profound and even almost mysterious sound. As in private relations any one may compassionately shut his eyes to the faults of another, so also here in the relation of the compassionate *Îśvara* to man. Such compassion is his *karmâ*. But *karmâ* is not expiating grace to the sinner.

One does not know in this religion the "curse" of sin. But "the curse" and the burden of the curse on the conscience smitten

especially Heb. ii. 17, and v. 9, are quite enough to bring to the "feeling" what cannot be put in logical form (*Begriff*). And I should expect of a cautious and acute "historian of religion" that he would confess that he could neither "comprehend" (*begreifen*) nor "understand through the feeling" what the importance is which people attach to this "fantastic" value of "propitiation," but that certainly the Christians imagined that they experienced it, and that, of all the "fantastic" goods conferred in their salvation, this seemed to them the most important; yea, that what is evidently typical Christianity can no longer exist, or exists only in a weakened form, where this axis of the life of faith and experience no longer exists. Regarding Indian religion, Deussen has already affirmed that the Indo-Aryan religion is totally "clean" of that sort of "Judaistic superstition"; and this affirmation of his, at least, is entirely correct, however vulnerable otherwise his interpretation of the Vedânta by means of Schopenhauer may be.

by it do in fact belong to the Christian idea of "sin." That has often enough been stigmatized as "pathological." But it is the necessary reaction of the soul toward a being who is not only sympathetic with pain, and placable in view of faults and defects, but who, as a *holy* being *must* be angry at the infringement of holy commands, and who reacts not only against faults, folly, and mistakes which attack a private friendship, but against life and conduct which attack profoundly the sphere of holiness itself, *i.e.* the holy sphere of ultimate values. In fact, what has often been criticized as a weakness of our traditional conception of God, that his forgiveness is connected with "objective conditions," the Christian recognizes as right. He who overlooks this overlooks the fact that according to the Christian conception, the relation between humanity and the eternally holy God *is not a "private relation."* God is bound by the restriction of the objective holiness of his commandment; or, in early, still primitive expression, he is the guardian of a holy order, which, although he has himself established it, is yet not so established that it is the private institution of a private person, which he can strengthen or relax at his pleasure. God cannot relax, except this relaxation is at the same time an "expiation," *i.e.* a cancellation and elimination of an objective wrong. His forgiveness must be such that, instead of laying the judgment *aside*, it carries this out in the soul of the sinner as the experience of the

"curse of sin," as the consummation of the "terrors of conscience," and that at the same time it effects the self-judgment of the sinner in remorse and repentance, now first fully awakened and most profoundly stirred.

The effect of "expiating grace" is in the first instance just the deep feeling and recognition of the "curse" itself, experienced in the depths of the soul. Peter felt it when he begged: "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord." Why and how such an expiating experience with its elements of deepest awe and of blissful comfort is produced and called forth by the word and work of Christ: why, in particular, by his Passion and Cross, as all Christian experience testifies, whence it possesses this "magic power" over the feelings and conscience, can never be expressed by logical theories. Ever higher rises the pyramid of dogmatic construction which we raise over this ineffable truth. Perhaps it is a pyramid of straw. And yet it is most characteristic of Christian theology that it is ever making new efforts regarding the *locus de reconciliatione*.

This problem marks the *greatest* difference of Christian theology from the theology of the bhakti-religion, yes, from all Indian theology whatever. For India has no "expiator," no Golgotha, and no Cross. It can see in all this nothing but "Judaistic remnants," or in its own words, *rajas* and *tamas*.

CONCLUSION

When we entered the great temple of Vishnu-Nārāyana in Vrindavana, a merchant in his modest shop offered us his wares. The consecrated signs and marks of Vishnu were there, the *Gītā* and other holy Scriptures. There was also a little pamphlet there with a strange title, in the midst of the Indian books. It was the Gospel of Luke. "Of whom does this book treat?"—"Of Jesus. He is the last Avatār of Vishnu." So think many in India. But another Indian said to me something quite different. "Are you not Aryans like us? Why have you left the old God of the Aryans and followed the Jews? When will you return to *your own* God?"

I wait for the day when *this* feeling will gain the upper hand in India, and when India will recognize and emphasize the *contrast* which exists between its and our religion, the day to which I have referred in my book, *Vishnu-Nārāyana*. I would welcome it. For then only will the situation and the condition of things become clear. And then no theoretical and *a priori* speculation as to the "absolutenss" of the one or the other will produce the decision in the ensuing conflict. It can be forced by no *a priori* logical principle. The opponent cannot be logically compelled by any conceptual rule, acknowledged by both parties as general and supreme, to acknowledge that the expiation

of the sinner is not a piece of "Judaic mythology," but something more "true" than rescue of the *ātman* from the bonds of *samsāra*. It is a question of another "*darśanam*," of another *vision*, of another *eye*. If a change is to come, another eye must first be opened.

APPENDICES

I. The Hidden God, and the God of the Bhaktas (page 26)

In contrast with the obscure God of purposeless, irrational omnipotence, ignoring rule and law, which the "old saga" of Draupadī preaches, Yudhishthira presents the God of the *bhaktas* when he appeals, against the unfathomable Being of "secret power," to faith, word, and revelation, and in so doing employs all the technical terms of the later bhakti-religion. I will give here this passage in abridgment. It is, maybe, a reminiscence of the rise of the bhakti-religion and of its breaking through from older forms of conceptions of God.

After Draupadī in excited words has uttered her inability to understand the ways of God to the righteous king, she continues by appealing to an *old* idea of the nature of the deity which had come to her ear, which she had long warded off, but which was now pressing upon her with great power. That this idea was not only her personal witness to sudden despair, breaking forth from her personal situation, but a general, widespread, obscure subsoil, or

perhaps bedrock of Indian religion, is confirmed by the circumstance that the author of the epic does not present it as Draupadī's own opinion, but as a "primitive saga."

With this obscure primitive faith the younger bhakti-religion contends. With it contends also —and perhaps contemporaneously—the religion of Buddha. This is influenced by like motives, as also is Yudhishthira, viz., "by the interest in free responsibility, in the validity of the moral commandments, in the righteous administration of moral order, and in the possibility of "salvation." But Buddha gives an answer absolutely different from that of the bhakti-religion. He *accepts* in a way the *thesis* of the "primitive saga," that Īśvara and omnipotence and universal causality, without purpose or rule, necessarily go together: and because this idea conflicts with freedom, responsibility, and the attainment of salvation, he *rejects* this Īśvara altogether. That is the meaning of the "atheism" of Buddhism. It maintains this meaning with immovable firmness down to its latest contest with theism, in the Hīnayāna as well as the Mahāyāna. If there is a God—so the Buddhist says—he is a being possessing unlimited power, all power, and the only power. But then responsibility and punishment have no meaning, and every doctrine of salvation is vain. And on its account they reject the idea of a God altogether.

Quite otherwise the germinating bhakti-religion. Draupadī had said:

21. In respect of this they relate an ancient saga :
The world lies in the power of its Lord, not in its own.

22. The Creator bestows of his own accord upon his creatures everything, pleasant and painful, weal and woe.

He, the Ruler, makes the seed which he himself has earlier cast into the "field" to spring up.[1]

23. As a skilful puppet-player makes a wooden puppet
And then causes it to move now one member, and now all, so does he do with these creatures.

24. Like space, so he (the sole causality) permeates all creatures
And thus decrees the noble as well as the evil (work).

25. Like a bird, tied to a cord, so is this (man) without freedom, led forward.
Lying in the power of God, master neither of others nor of himself.

26. As a pearl (without will) is strung upon a string, like an ox,
Through whose nose the rope is drawn, he must follow the direction of the Creator, fulfilling it, entirely determined by it.

27. No moment of self-determination has the man,
Like a tree thrown down from the bank, and fallen into the midst of the stream.

[1] Viz., the evil or good deed which he has caused to be done in its time.

28. Blind, powerless slave in regard to his own weal or woe
    He goes to Heaven, or journeys down to Hell, as the Lord impels him.
29. As the blades of grass must bend when the mighty wind blows,
    So all creatures according to the (omni-) potence of the Creator.
30. Now harnessing him to the noble work, now to the evil,
    He remains (hidden), having entered into his creatures (and taking his "hiding-place" in them), so that no one can point to him and say, "See, there He is."

So far the saga seems to go. Draupadī continues:

31. Only causally conditioned (without the teleology of purposive aims) is this body of the Creator (viz., the world) which is also called his "field,"
    Whereby, all-permeating (and all-powerful), he causes work to be done, with good or bad fruit.
32. Behold how he as Lord exercises this magic power of his,
    He, who his creatures through his creatures smites, after he has blinded them by his magic.
33. Otherwise (than as you say) have the ancient sages who once beheld the truth [1] (viz.,

[1] Note that Draupadī even for the old faith appeals to seers and masters. But they certainly did not, like Draupadī, regard this God of uncontrolled omnipotence as a torturing problem. It is not till the new situation of a new generation that this God becomes a problem. See on this point further below.

the authors of the ancient saga) viewed the creatures. Otherwise (than as you affirm) are the creatures driven about, viz., as come the (irregular) puffs of the wind.

34. Quite otherwise (than as you affirm) do the purusha's behave, they are now this, now that (so that they lack individual identity and the possibility of right direction).

35. Quite otherwise (than as you say) does the Lord deal with his creatures: He forms and changes them (not by law but arbitrarily).

36. Yea, rather: as one splits wood with wood and stone with stone,

As one cuts iron with iron, in which both (instrument and object) are purely passive and without purpose—

36. Just so he proceeds, the exalted, the God, the Self-existent, the Origin of every origin,

He smites creature with creature after he has made them his mask,

37. Bringing them together, then resolving them, proceeding according to his arbitrary will,

The Lord, the exalted One, *plays* his play with his creatures as a child with his toys.

38. The Creator does not bear himself towards his creatures as a mother or a father would.

Only as with wrath does he go to work.

And as he does, so does after him the remaining crowd (men of violence, like Duryodhana).

39. Noble men, who preserve their integrity, I see disgraced, robbed of the barest necessities!

Ignoble men I see prosperous. My senses are confused.

40. Thee must I see in this distress and Duryodhana in wealth!

I *rebuke* the Creator who regards personality so unjustly.

41. If he bestows prosperity on this Duryodhana, the transgressor of every law, the rogue, the robber, the destroyer of the faith, will the Creator himself then perhaps —thus I ask you—suffer the "fruit" of this (bad) work of his?

42. If the work done seizes upon the worker himself and does not come to any other one,

So would even God himself be soiled by such an evil deed (as favouring the criminal Duryodhana).

43. (Since you do not grant that), then the rule that the evil done by a work be is to reckoned to the evil-worker, does not hold at all.

Then power alone therefore holds! Pitiable then are the people who cannot or will not exercise power!

Yudhishthira answers her in a long discourse. He closes with the words (section 31, v. 40):

40. Thus may thy doubt vanish like the mist (before the sun).

Ponder (on ground of the preceding instruction) and see confidently: Everything (pertaining to God and the faith) *is* (in truth); and dismiss the idea of the "Nāstika's" (*i.e.* those who deny salvation and God).

41. Do not cast away God, the Creator of all beings.

Rather, learn to know him, reverence him, and permit no longer thoughts of doubt to arise within you.

42. He, through whose *grace* the *bhakta* enters into the freedom of death,

He is the highest (absolute) Deity!
Revile him no more, O Draupadi!

Grace, bhakti, word of grace, the appeal to a Higher revelation: with these means the young bhakti-religion protects itself against the secret dread of the *ancient* feeling in respect to God, as the ancient saga makes him known. The followers of the Sānkhya-system, of Buddha, of Jina, protected themselves against this feeling by denying Īśvara entirely—all three from like motives and with like reasons, but the followers of Krishna, to whom Yudhishthira belongs, find another way.

Since they go the way of the bhakti, the old dark God (whom, nevertheless, Draupadī still

calls "the exalted") gradually disappears almost entirely before the luminous form of God (before the "*facies revelata*," as Luther says). But this is only in the *later* development: for in the *Gītā* he is still quite in evidence as the dark *background* and basis, which in the midst of the bhakti-religion of the *Gītā*, in chapter XI, suddenly appears in all his old fearful majesty and might behind the God of grace, and then at the end veils himself in the *carama-śloka*, in his word of gracious promise, as Luther does.[1]

I have referred elsewhere to the analogies in the Book of Job to these "numinous" feelings. The "covering"[2] in Job in distinction from the Indian story consists in this, that the "stilling" of the tormenting doubt is found in the experience of the magnitude of the miraculous creative power, which surpasses every conception and every standard of rational computability.

The old saga of Draupadī is instructive in reference to another question. The representatives of an "original monotheism" affirm that at the beginning of the development of religious ideas, faith in the one God, Creator of the world, who was also the God of morals and of righteousness, already existed, and that this faith was later obscured. This apparently supernaturalistic doctrine of an "original revelation" is often unmasked on closer examination, and appears as

[1] Here also a parallel between West and East exists, viz., that in the later development in Protestant preaching these deep numinous foundations of the Lutheran feeling in respect to God are rationalized, anthropomorphized, and lost.

[2] *Deckung*.

a very rationalistic theory: the original man made his appearance possessed of sound powers of *understanding*, in consequence of which he, following the clue of causality, logically *concluded* that there was one, almighty Cause of the world. The truth in the assumption of an original monotheism is that probably an idea of God broke forth in fact upon various groups of humanity earlier than the evolutionary theorists are accustomed to assume. Even Draupadī's "saga" points back to a secret, very ancient tradition. But the belief in God of which this informs us, looks very different from that of the "original monotheists." Certainly it did not arise from logical reasoning. It is the first higher development of what we (in *The Idea of the Holy*) have called the numinous feeling. It is not a body of conclusions, but a *darśanam*, that is an original intuition, and that an intuition of a highest being and power, numinous and non-rational, which is above all *logical deduction*. The rise of this feeling, however, cannot be genetically *explained*. And thus it corresponds to the idea of real "revelation" much better than the supposition of a logical conclusion of Adam's which entirely excludes the "revelation." It makes by its inexplicability peremptory demand for the religious idea of an active, self-revealing announcement from above to the experience of primeval mind.

That such experience has occurred only to those especially predisposed and prepared therefor, *i.e.* in elect souls, the ancient account

presupposes, which also appeals to "seers who behold the truth" (see above, verse 33). For these, this God of exalted and exclusive omnipotence,[1] towards whom the only attitude of the creature was that of humble dependence,[2] was not a tormenting problem as it was for Draupadī. A tormenting problem it could become only when, in contrast to earlier times, the individual with his individual fate and his individual significance became conscious of himself, as the collective subject, the group, broke up into individual subjects, with their individual failings, their individual deeds, wrong and right. In such a situation, such a God could, and must, become a problem, a tormenting Job's problem, which India too has felt.

That then in this situation there followed, instead of the breaking up and gradual disappearance of the idea of God, a new stage of faith in him, is again for the mere "historian of religion" a simple, irreducible fact, with all the inexplicability of every simple fact. For the circle of those upon whom such new belief arose, it was again a pure "revelation": revelation not through the subtleties of the reason, but through new,[3] greater seers, through the new *darśanam* of a new faith.

What we have found here in India, if not as "original" theism, yet as a very ancient theism of numinous majesty and absolute universal

[1] A God of Kismet
[2] Islam.
[3] Yudhishthira substitutes for the old *munis* to whom Draupadī appealed, the *rishis*, whom she had herself seen with her own eyes, and who in part belonged to her own family circle (verses 11 and 13).

causality, may be found perhaps also in other fields of the early periods of religion. It would be a separate problem to follow up the more general traces of this old Íśvara, who was not yet the Lord of bhakti, but was the dark, omnipotent God of the religion which sprung from the numinous "creature feeling."[1] Thus the "kismet-faith"[2] of the Orient appears to me to be neither the late fruit of the extension of Mohammedanism, nor mere "fatalism." For mere fatalism is an-íśvara (without God): kismet, however, as well as the faith of the "old saga," is thoroughly sa-íśvara (with God). Fatalism is resignation, but genuine kismet with Islam means humility.

2. Propitiation and Expiation

(page 105)

As Isaiah stands in the Temple before God and beholds the Holy One, he says: "Woe is me! for I am undone, because I am a man of unclean lips." Then there flies to him one of the seraphim with a live coal in his hand, which he has taken from the (holy) altar, touches his mouth with it, and says: "Lo, this hath touched thy lips; and thine iniquity is taken away, and thy sin *expiated*," and Isaiah can now stand before God. A fault which excluded him from the fellowship of the Holy One had been taken away. He is "purified," and this purification

[1] Compare *The Idea of the Holy*, p. 8.
[2] As also the idea of Islam = submission.

is more than a mere declaration of remission of transgressions and different from it. The highest human analogy to it is "forgiveness." But even this is an insufficient analogy for a proceeding which takes place in quite another sphere than the rational sphere of the forgiveness of injuries and remission of guilt among natural men. It lies in the wholly irrational[1] sphere of numinous desert and ill-desert, which cannot be reduced to the mere values of rational ethics, and can only be understood (and then not "comprehended") by him who understands what "holy" is in its specific peculiarity. "The Holy One" performs this expiation himself, not another apart from him. He himself "covers," expiates, sanctifies, bestows the "kapporeth," the covering, without which no creature may "see" him and not perish. He performs this by a "means," an *ἱλαστήριον*, in this case by the touch of an object which belongs to him, which itself lies in the sphere of "holiness." With the glowing fire of the holy altar-coal, he burns the "unholy" from Isaiah's lips. What happens here is a "contact," a touching which the Holy One effects by a sanctifying means, which furnishes for the designation of mere rational exculpation by forgiveness neither term nor figure, and which for a rationalistic estimate must remain quite "unclear," but which would yet be as profoundly intelligible to "sinners" to-day as it was to Isaiah.

For the Church of the New Covenant, the

[1] That is *non-rational*, and so frequently elsewhere. P. H. P.

"Mediator" takes the place of the "means." The New Testament writers know that every ἱλαστήριον, all the means of expiation in antiquity, were only shadows and imperfect symbols of true expiation, which is performed no longer by material means, but by "contact" with the Elect of God, who gave himself up to God in personal faith and obedience, even unto the cross, and thus became the perfected and sanctified Holy One of God. The old primitive idea of expiation is thus "spiritualized." All material transfer, all material means have disappeared and been replaced by the idea of personal, obedient surrender, even to the utmost test of obedience. The "blood" of this "lamb" does not expiate by the magic power of a ritual like the sacrificial blood of "goats and calves," but because the shedding of this blood was a highest act of true obedience and faith, which this Mediator—as the Epistle to the Hebrews says—must himself "learn," and by which only he himself is "made perfect." And the "contact" with this expiating object is here the personal and spiritual contact of believing trust, believing search for fellowship, believing following. But in all such "spiritualization" the old idea of expiation remains entirely unaltered. It does not become any "clearer" to the logical understanding. It remains that wholly untheorizable secret, which can, on the one hand, be most profoundly *experienced*, and, on the other, becomes the more "incomprehensible" the more profoundly it is

experienced. The error of our orthodox doctrines of "reconciliation" was not that they clung to "a mythological remnant," but that they did not understand the terms of the old mysticism of the sacrificial worship, and carried over into the sphere of jurisprudence what had lain entirely in the purely numinous sphere of ἁγίασθαι, ἁγιστήριον, of clean and unclean in the numinous sense—yes, that rather they offered any *theory* at all for what is necessarily purely untheoretical because quite irrational, and ought not to be brought at all into the sphere of theory, but ought to be left in the realm of pure feeling, expressed in prayer, hymn, and sacrament, and for the rest, as much as possible, undiscussed and unnoticed.

The latter error is made by those who are surprised that Jesus did not speak of himself in his own preaching as an expiation, that the theology of the original church, that Paul and later teachers are the first to have "theories of expiation," and that one must come to the unnatural supposition that Jesus' entire life-work was therefore only the work of a forerunner of himself as the one who should some day die upon the cross, so that only with the preaching of the Apostles the gospel really begins. But are then—so we ask—the fragmentary hints and the terms from the ancient language of sacrifice found in Paul and John intended as a "theory"? Are they more or other than what must necessarily arise from the nature of the thing, as expression of the feelings, not only with men who

lived in the old (so-called mythological) world of ideas and had the Hebrew conception of sins and expiation, but with every "sinner" when face to face with life and death of Christ? And further, does one expect that the first "publicans and sinners" who gathered about the "Holy One of God" must have known in logical formulation what the effect which they felt in the conscience from being near him and in contact with him was? Or that he must himself have "known" about, and must have reflected upon, and must have theorized over, his guilt-abolishing power for his followers? And, finally, that which was wrought by the one who died on the cross is qualitatively nothing else than that which he wrought when alive. On the *cross* was "finished" what was the meaning also of this *life*. Peter did not for the first time experience what Isaiah experienced when Christ died, but it was when he fell down before him with the prayer: "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man" and when the prayer was not heard.

It is said: In the Lord's Prayer we ask for the forgiveness of sins without appeal to any expiation. But one forgets that this prayer is not a prayer for all the world,[1] but the common prayer of this special messianic sacred community called unto the new "covenant," and for those who belonged to it. The founding of a covenant

[1] "Directed by divine institution we *dare* to say"—thus the mass introduces the Lord's Prayer. There is thereby indicated what every Christian feels to be a matter of course, viz., that the Lord's Prayer is anything but a matter of course.

and of a sacred community for it, are, however, by themselves, sanctifying acts of divine election, by which a circle of men are drawn out of the profane sphere, consecrated, purified, expiated; and the messianic mediator of these acts and union with him is exactly that which the ἱλαστήρια were at the founding of the old covenant and for the maintenance of the old covenant. Or appeal is made to the publican in the Temple who prayed: "God be merciful to me, a sinner," without knowing anything about an expiation. But they overlook that even the publican "went up to the Temple," *i.e.* that he naïvely and instinctively, like the "original church" and Paul, lived in the atmosphere and feelings of his time, and sought the Temple, the place of the expiatory presence, when his guilt oppressed him.

"Expiatory presence" — that is the very significance of Christ in his life and on his cross. Only that there is here "more" than temple, goats, and calves.

3. The Experience of Unity in the Mysticism of Identity, in antithesis to the Experience of Grace in the Bhakti-religion (pages 34–35)

Hymns ordinarily represent the substance of characteristic religious experiences better than doctrines. I have given in the first section some examples of the hymns of the bhakti-religion. In contrast with those hymns may be

added one which attempts to give the experiences of the strict monist.

Realization of the Self as Braiman, Being, Spirit, Bliss (Tejobindu-upanishad, cap. 3).

1. I am in essence the highest Braiman, am highest bliss.

   Pure Knowledge of essence am I, am purely the highest.

2. Purely repose am I in essence, am purely spirit in genus.

   Purely of enduring essence am I, am purely eternal.

3. Pure being am I in essence, having given up the "ego," I only am I.

   Of all (things) of free essence am I, am infinity of spirit in genus.

4. Only the "fourth" [1] am I of essence, yes, as the absolute I have surpassed even the "fourth."

   Unceasingly conscious of essence am I, am spirit and bliss in genus.

5. Of absolute form am I of essence, am of pure [2] being unceasingly.

   Only knowledge of essence am I, only pleasure.

6. *Without antithesis (in distinctions) is my essence, without wish, without fault.*

[1] The "fourth" in the "fourth condition," viz., that of identity with the Brahman himself.

[2] Pure of all *kelesas*, of all disturbances through lusts, through weal or woe.

Always without attachment, without change, intransitory.

7. Always of simply homogeneous essence am I, always spirit only in form.

Of unlimited essence am I, because possessing endless bliss as my essence.

8. Bliss higher than being, bliss higher than the spirit, is my essence.

The most intimate of the most intimate is my essence, not in the realm of word or understanding.

9. Bliss of the atman am I of essence, am bliss of the real unceasingly.

The pleasure-garden of the self am I, for I am the Self itself.

10. Self-clearness am I, for the atman-light is the essence of my essence.

Without beginning, middle, end am I, for I am like the ether.

11. Eternally pure, purely spirit, bliss, being am I, intransitory.

Eternally awake, and spotless, only being, spirit, bliss am I.

12. My essence even surpasses the eternal, beyond everything am I.

Beyond all form am I of essence, with the form of the æther.

13. Bliss in absolute fullness of essence am I, always inexpressible in speech.

Habitat of all things am I in essence, am always a unique mass of spirit.

14. Free of bodily being, I am always free of thinking [1] (without care).

Free of the functions of the organ of thought am I, thought itself in unitary, homogeneous form am I.

15. Of all "intuited" things I am free, am only "intuition itself" of essence.

Continuously of full (filled with all things) essence am I, am always satisfied with eternity.

16. The ego is Brahman, and (thereby) the universe. For I am entirely Consciousness.

"I only" am I, I alone; having the form of the universe as essence.

17. I only am the great Atman, I am even higher than the highest.

I (myself) appear (illusorily) as the other, I as the body.

18. I appear as the scholar (and the master), for I myself am the bearer of the threefold world.

I am beyond the three times (past, present, and future). I am the one reverenced by the three Vedas.

19. I am taught by the Holy Scriptures. I am he who tarries in the organ of thought.

Without me there is nothing, without me even the earth is not.

[1] *Discursive thinking is overcome and the organ of the discursive* understanding is suppressed, where the spirit has become one of "pure knowledge."

20. Whatever is different from me is not: that must they say.

I am the Brahman, am the perfect one; eternally pure am I always.

21. Guna-free, pure self am I, am always without form.

For only Brahman alone am I, grow not old, am free from death.

22. I shine only through myself, through myself Being itself.

Through myself alone do I exist in myself, through myself am I the highest way.

23. Through myself I myself enjoy, through myself have I myself ecstasy.

Through myself am I the light that is myself, through myself am I myself radiance.

24. In my own atman shall I through myself have bliss, my own self alone I contemplate,

Only in my own self happily tarrying, with my own self left alone and continuing.

25. In my own self through myself I shall have my habitat, I delight myself in the kingdom of my own self and its happiness.

Resting upon the throne of my own self, I think of nothing that were different from the atman.

26. Spirit in essence alone, Being, Spirit, Bliss, timeless,

I am nothing but a mass of pleasure, am Brahman alone.

27. Always am I of all objects empty, have all bliss of atman.

Of eternal bliss am I of essence, am always infinity of atman.

28. I only am myself the æther of the heart, having the sun of the spirit as my essence.

Through the self in the self quickened, I am without form, intransitory.

29. Freed am I from singularity (isolated individuality), am of eternally free essence.

Finer am I than the æther itself, am without beginning and end.

30. Absolute clearness of essence am I, have the higher and the lower happiness (happiness of every stage).

Being only is my essence, pure release is my essence.

31. The bliss of the real is my essence, an individual mass of essential bliss.

Only knowledge is my essence as Being, Knowledge, Bliss.

32. All this (the phenomenal world) is certainly only Brahman, anything other than Brahman is not.

But that I am: am the Brahman blissful with being, the Ancient of Days.

33. What is called "Thou" or "That" is nothing different from me.

Spirit, Consciousness am I: I myself am the highest Siva.

34. A Superbeing am I of essence, I myself am happiness itself.

Because every object to be witnessed to has

passed away, there is no further witnessing for me to perform.

35. Because I only am Brahman, I am the original atman himself.

I only am Ádisesha,[1] am the remnant,[2] for I only am.

36. From name and form am I free, am bliss only of form.

Am free of the senses, am all being of essence.

37. Gone is for me "binding" and "loosing," of continuous bliss am I of form.

The original consciousness am I, the undivided, uniform essence.

38. I am outside the region of word and understanding, am everyway happiness.

Am everyway filled with all things, am the fulness, am blissful.

39. Absolutely satisfied am I, am throughout the highest ambrosia of essence.

"One only, without a second, the living Brahman alone I am": of that there is no doubt.

40. I am empty of all things of essence, to me refer all Holy Scriptures.

Released am I, release of essence:
Nirvana's happiness is my essence.

41. Knowledge of the real alone am I, full of the bliss of pure being.

Beyond the "fourth" condition am I, am without opposition (of all differences).

[1] The serpent that bears the world.
[2] This remains when the universe of multiplicity vanishes.

42. For of eternal essence that never came into being am I, without desires, without falsity.

Pure am I, awake am I, eternal am I, Lord am I.

I am the sense of the syllable Om, I am free of all stains.

4. God is not a Private Being (page 107)

God would remain a mere "private being" if he were only an invisible, almighty, absolute, spiritual person. Yes, this were true if he were such a *holy* person, *i.e.* a person with only the *predicate* "holy," but not "holiness itself." It is by this definition of God that the relation of man to the deity is withdrawn from all analogy to a private relation, and only so is all sin really sin against God himself.

"Holiness itself"—for this, the old name was "the *idea*[1] of holiness." From "idea" comes "idealism." Since Christianity understands that sin is more than a rupture of a mere private relation, it is necessarily "idealism." The Scripture confesses this idealism when, in the Fourth Gospel, it places the "Logos" (which is "Life itself" and "Truth itself," that is, the idea of life, the idea of truth) in the very essence of the eternal Godhead, "before all worlds,"

[1] Idea, not in the modern sense of a thought, but in the Platonic sense. Compare αὐταγαθὸν = the good itself.

itself. He does not *have* life, but "I *am* the life." He does not *have* truth, but "I *am* the truth."

In connexion herewith and in the interpretation of the first chapters of John's Gospel, Augustine—not as the first, but as the most significant of such writers — develops this "idealism" that is indispensable to Christianity. He combines in his thought of God Idea and concrete Spirit. And he is right in combining them. For God must be both in one, or else he is not the Christian God, but only the God of a bhakti-religion. God, eternal, concrete spirit, does not *have* holiness, as one has predicates, but he is "holiness itself," just as the eternal Logos is not *had* by God, but *is* God (i. 1).[1] The bhakti-religion never discovered this doctrine. Îsvara *has* his "noble qualities." That means he remains, even if in infinite enlargement of all ideal predicates, always only a "private being."

5. Entirely of Grace

(page 58)

Yāmuna gives the culmination to the doctrine of grace in a remarkable passage of his "Gem of Praise":

> Whether I am body, or senses, or mind, or consciousness, or ātman—what one of these I

[1] Compare the scholastic doctrine, that God does not *have* his attributes, but is they. He does not *have* goodness as a property, but he *is* his goodness itself.

may ever be, or what I may be on the whole is to me of little consequence; may I be this or that according to circumstances.

(One thing only do I know of myself with absolute certainty) this ego is obtained by me only from the lotus of thy feet, and only *just now*.

The ancient commentator says on this: "All the investigations of the schools as to what, how great, or how otherwise determined the ego is, these do not amount to much. Thou who knowest everything knowest it. That I am thy 'remnant' is the kernel of my being." Yāmuna in the verse above quoted incorporates even the Buddhistic doctrine of momentariness in his confession: "I am what I am by thy gift, and I am this *only just now*." And this is the most refined thing in the entire passage: existence is not "to be," but it is "to be by grace," and by grace ever new from moment to moment.

Yāmuna is to-day almost unknown. It was upon my last journey to India that, in Mysore, I became acquainted, among the followers of Rāmānuja, with his "Three-fold Proof." We had visited in the morning the venerable and spiritual Parakāla-svāmin, the successor to Rāmānuja's patriarchate, and had driven in the afternoon in the carriage of the hospitable Mahārāja of Mysore to the little temple of Nārāyana's on the top of the Cāmundi mountain. The mighty red-brown plateau of South India spread out beneath us, in the north to the silvery shining

Mother Kaveri, in the south to the riven porphyry walls of the Nilgiri. Night fell rapidly, and the plain vanished in immensity. We sat still upon a projecting ledge with Alcondavilli Govinda, the old Brahmin and unwearied interpreter of the writings of the "visishta-advaita." And as the first stars broke forth in the new night, he sang softly the verses of Yāmuna, quoted above, which end in the words: *only just now*.

6. The Prodigal Son—in India?

I translate in what follows a text from the bhakti-religion which at a first careless glance might seem to afford a parallel to the parable of the Prodigal Son, in which we rightly perceive the deepest and most typical spirit of Christianity. When reading this text in India for the first time, I was almost startled by the resemblance, and, as so many in like circumstances have done, I at first supposed it borrowed from Christianity. But this can hardly have been the case; the text as a whole is perfectly intelligible from purely Indian premises without the hypothesis of a borrowing from the Bible. The content is wholly derived from the spirit of Indian bhakti-religion. I found this text when I was searching in the Adyar Library for documents which might throw light on the three holy places of Vishnu in South India, namely, Kāñcipuram (Conjeeveram), Srirangam, and Tirupati. It was a *Mahātmyam* on Kāñcipuram, *i.e.* a book depicting the "glory" of this holy

place of Vishnù and recording the legends associated with his great temple. As translated, the piece is as follows :

1. There was once a Brahman in the town of the Madras, by name Krishivalla, evil of mind and of unbridled senses.
2. *Malignant, given to heresy, wasting his father's substance, devoted* to play and drink, persecuting and robbing the pious.
3. After he had by deceit and theft gained possession of his father's goods, he squandered it on harlots.
4. At last, owing to his evil courses, he was driven from home by his father ; he went away, and lived with a harlot, with whom he revelled madly day and night.
6. *Thus fallen, having lost his good karma, no longer practising* ablutions or prayer or service of fire, he lived like an outcaste, an eater of flesh, a drinker, till all his money was gone.
7. When the woman saw him without means, she turned unkind and despised him ; and it was evil with him, as he saw himself on the edge of ruin.
8. Without home or family, his strength gone from him, he fell *into dejection, and thought within himself : How can I come* by money again ?
9. As one bereft of his wits harps ever on money, he one night slunk unseen by the guards into the king's palace ;
10. There he found the king's young son, wearing much costly ornament, lying on a bed, and seized him violently
11. As the tiger seizes the calf, and pitiless struck him down in the *darkness, took all his jewels and fled out.*
12. But without the guards spied him, laid hold on him and his booty, and sent word to the king.
13. As he lay dying the boy cried aloud in pain, so that the servants heard his voice and came with haste and horror.
14. They found him dead, and also saw the murderer, seized by the guards ; in grief they wailed aloud.
15. *When the king saw his son, struck down by the robber, his heart* was convulsed within him, and he made loud lamentation.
16. After he had long bewailed with kinsfolk and friends, his Brahmans [his *guru*, etc.] comforted him, bidding him think of the law of fate.
17. The next day he had the Brahman murderer brought before him and said : "I may not slay a Brahman, even a thief, no, not *even though he were the murderer of a Brahman.*
18. But I will take from this man all he has, I will have him scourged, I will put a skull [for contempt, and to defile him by degradation] in his hands,
19. And a dog's paw as his mark, and have him proclaimed as a murderer in the public market-place, then drive him out of the land."

20. Thus he did to him, according to the law. Now Kūshīvalla, when expelled from the land, lived in the forest, and, tortured by sorrow, was brought to a better mind.
21. He spoke to himself: "I, a Brahman, lost my good *karma*, became a robber of my father's goods, a thief, a drinker, an eater of foods impure,
22. A riotous liver, a rascal, a fallen one. How can I then be healed?" Thus brooding, full of suffering, he wandered southward over the Vindhya hills, praying:
23. "O Purushottama, protect me, who am bereft of right and lost; O Lotus-eyed, O Lord of all, famed for the wealth of Thy virtues [pity, kindness, compassion],
24. Draw me forth, forth from my misery; Thou only art my refuge."
35. Thus wailing and ever again sighing, then calling aloud: "Save me, O Nārāyana," he wandered on from forest to forest, from rock to rock, from lake to lake;
36. Bathing now in this sacred lake, now in that other, now in seas, now in rivers, he bent his thoughts upon Acyuta, the Lotus-eyed.
37. Then after a long while he came to our land, Satyavrata, and found here the best of all bathing-places, built by Kaushika [in Kāñcīpuram],
38. And meditating on Vishnu, he here bathed; and lo! his right arm quivered and his right eye, and suddenly the storm of his soul was still.
39. Upon these signs and tokens he became full of joy and cried aloud: "O Nārāyana," and plunged deep in the water.
40. And to him there came [as messengers of Vishnu] the Heavenly Ones, with Indra at their head, and rained down flowers.
41. And as he came up again from the bath to the bank, they saw him freed from wrong-doing, like the moon set free again from the jaws of Rahu [eclipse],
[And straightway they took him into their heavenly chariot and carried him to heaven].

This text—at all events in its first part and its outcome—really might sound like an echo from our Bible. And the attempt often has been made to explain the whole Indian religion of grace in that sense, by pointing, *e.g.*, to the ancient settlements of Nestorian Christians, especially in South India. But this was to forget that the *Bhagavad-gītā*, the classical text of all bhakti-religion, unquestionably is older than the

Christian colonies from Syria in India. Moreover, it seems that the missionary activity of these communities soon died down. They came to form a strictly closed caste of their own. And at the time when the bhakti-religion in the Tamil country experienced its great reformation and revival, we learn nothing of any special missionary activity on the part of the Nestorians. No convincing proof of their influence has as yet been brought forward. It is even a question, indeed, whether (so far as the doctrine of grace is concerned) any profound influence could emanate from them, for no real evidence exists that at that time this doctrine was specially characteristic of the Nestorian Church. And the fire and lofty enthusiasm of the Indian Alvars and Adiyars, in whom the spirit of the *Gītā* took new life, has probably nothing in common with the spirit of Syrian Christianity. Such an influence could only be credited if proof were forthcoming that in those Syrian Churches there had prevailed a strongly Pauline type of Christianity, in a markedly emotional form; for it is with such a type that the bhakti-religion could best be compared. But this certainly was not the case. As I have said, what happened was not *borrowing but a convergence of form.*

And I say further: this gave rise to a resemblance which by no means issued in an identity between Indian and Christian faith and experience. Our text itself makes this clear. The text is a "conversion-story," such as frequently occurs in the legends and the practice of bhakti-

religion. As such it is moving, and shows how deep this religion is. Still, Krishivalla is not the same as the son in the Gospel, who had been lost and was found. The differences are plain on closer inspection.

"I have sinned against heaven and before thee," says the lost son. The burden which weighs him down and from which he longs to be free is the burden of sin and guilt, and when this is taken away, he is content even if he must live as a hired servant in his father's house. It is the trouble of his conscience and his heart as bruised by sin that presses on him. With Krishivalla it is different. Not certainly that we should doubt that here too conscience is at work. But the feeling which thus arises in him is strictly not so much deep repentance as shame. And above all, of what does he complain? Of this, that he has lost his good *karma* and is entangled in an evil *karma*, whereby he forfeits his standing as a Brahman, and has opened before him the prospect of painful reincarnations in new existences. The fact that he was born a Brahman he owed to his earlier good *karma*, and in virtue thereof he had the assured prospect of an ever-rising advance up the ladder of being. Now he is "fallen" from all that. His present life and his later incarnations are now bound by the sinister power of this evil *karma*, and this turns his whole existence to suffering. It is not sorrow over sin which moves him, but sorrow over the misery he now has to bear, and which he will have to bear in the new incarnations. Hence he turns

to Vishnu, who is famous for his compassion with sufferers, and who possesses the mysterious power of breaking the force of such evil *karma* as leads to ever-renewed pain. In sympathy Vishnu bends down to the tortured man. But the God and Father of Christ bends down in mercy to those who are bruised by sin and guilt, and the Christian redemption is not deliverance from pain-bringing *karma*; it is the justification and sanctification of the sinner, as of one whose sin is purged.[1]

7. The Pictures

The picture opposite page 96 presents India's great thinker, Sankara, the master of the *kevala-advaita, i.e.* of the strictly theomonistic mysticism of India, the acknowledged head of all smärta-brahmins till to-day, whose successor is the jagad-guru at Sringeri in the state of Mysore. Sankara's type, as a young man, sitting and teaching, is preserved in the traditions. Our picture of him has been taken from a statue in wood, which the able sthäpati Siddha-lingappa in Mysore prepared at my suggestion. He promised not to make the statue till he had seen with the spiritual eye the original in meditation. Sankara is regarded as a worshipper of Siva. He therefore carries on forehead, breast, and arms, the tripundram, the three parallel cross-lines, the sectarian sign of the adherents of Siva. On his

[1] Reprinted by permission from *The International Review of Missions*, July 1930.

right arm rests the banneret, the sign of the spiritual guru. The fingers of the right hand form the gesture of the teacher. His left holds his great work, the commentary on the Vedānta-sūtras.

The frontispiece shows his great opponent, Rāmānuja, the theologian of the bhakti-religion of Vishnu. He died at an advanced age. His hands are folded in prayer, doing namaskāra towards his God. On his forehead he bears the sign of the worshipper of Vishnu, the foot of the "Lord," on the right shoulder the cakra, and on the left the conch of Vishnu. He too sits upon the chair of the guru, which to-day the parakāla-svāmin in Mysore occupies. The picture was prepared after an old bronze statue which I was able to buy in India. Both figures belong now to the Marburg Collection for the Science of Religion.[1]

[1] "Die Marburger religionskundliche Sammlung" is for the collection of religious symbols, rituals, and apparatus of the religions both of civilized and primitive peoples, for purposes of inspection, study, and teaching. It has a special division for the various Christian sects, and for missions. It depends upon the voluntary gifts and free co-operation of such as are interested in the comparative study of religions. Collaboration by gathering and loaning, or contributing material for the science of religion from private collections will be thankfully received.

GLOSSARY OF SANSCRIT TERMS

Adrishta, the invisible mysterious power of Karman.
Advaita, non-duality.
Advitîya, non-dual, without a second.
Ahamkâra, the I-consciousness.
Ahimsâ, not hurting.
Aklishta, undefiled.
Amritam, ambrosia, immortality.
Arjuna, friend of Krishna.
Âtman, the self, the soul.
Âtma-siddhi, realization of the self.
Avatâra, descent from heaven, incarnation of a divine being.
Avidyâ, nescience.

Bhagavad-gîtâ, a most sacred scripture, the groundwork of bhakti-faith.
Bhakta, a man who has bhakti.
Bhakti, surrender and attachment to God in love, faith, and obedience.
Brahman, the mystical, all-transcending spiritual principle of the universe.

Cakra, wheel.
Carama-sloka, the finishing and most important verse of Bhagavad-gîtâ, containing the gist of the whole book.

Darśanam, view, intuition. System of metaphysical doctrine.

Gîtâ, Bhagavad-gita.
Guru, master.

Hînayâna, the so-called southern school of Buddhism.

Îśvara, the Lord, solemn name of God.

Jagad-guru, world-master, œcumenical teacher and patriarch.

Kainkarya, service.
Karman, the ritual, moral work. Man's deeds, good or bad.
Karuṇâ, compassion.
Kevala-advaita, the strict form of advaita.
Kleśa, defilement.

Mahayana, the so-called northern school of Buddhism.
Maitri, friendship, kindness.
Manas, mind.
Marga, path.
Mâyâ, mysterious and miraculous power; the mysterious power of cosmical delusion.
Moksha, liberation, release.
Muc, to liberate.
Mukta, the liberated or the emancipated one.
Mukti, liberation, freeness from binding, salvation in the Lord's heaven.
Mukunda, giver of mukti, saviour.

Namaskâra, homage.
Nârâyana, name of the Lord.
Nihshreyasa, highest moksha.
Nirvâna, nirvana.

Pâpa, evil.
Parakâla-svâmin, title of the patriarch of Râmânuja school in Mysore.
Parama-âtman, the highest âtman.
Prakriti, nature.
Prasâda, grace.
Punar janma, rebirth to a new bodily existence.
Purusha, spirit.
Purushottama, the highest spirit.

Rajas, passion.
Rakshana, keeping, saving.

Sadhu, good, pious. Title for a monk.
Samsâra, wandering of the soul from one bodily existence to another, name for the changing and fleeting world in general.
Sat, being.
Sreyas, verum and summum bonum.
Sruti, holy scripture.

Tamas, darkness.

Vedânta, the metaphysical parts of the Veda and the doctrines founded thereon.
Vighna, obstacle.

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